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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. EVERETTE MACINTVRE * AND
JOACHIM J. VOLHARD**
Commissioner Maclntyre and Mr. Volhard have prepared
an extensive article on the functions of the Federal Trade
Commission, which traces the legislative history of the Com-
mission, its relationship to the three branches of government,
and the Commission's own rules of practice. The article ex-
plores the Commission's problems and successes in estab-
lishing and enforcing priorities, and in this fashion points
out often overlooked considerations which dictate or in-
fluence the activities and policies of the Commission. While
this comprehensive analysis discusses many of the activities
of the Commission during the decade of the 1960s, the au-
thors also have included a specific section which traces the
most important antitrust cases during the decade, as well as
the recent developments in the area of deceptive practices.
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I. HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION1
A. Creation of the Federal Trade Commission
Subsequent to the Civil War and the consequent increasing
commercial intercourse between the states came the realization that
Congress, constitutionally charged with the regulation of commerce,'
would be unable to concern itself with this matter on a day-to-day
basis. As a result, a number of agencies were created to deal with the
minutiae of regulating commerce. With the exception of the Federal
Trade Commission, these agencies are entrusted with the regulation
of specific industries; the Commission, on the other hand, is charged
with regulating that vast array of American businesses not otherwise
the subject of special federal regulation. Its primary task is to keep
competition both free and fair.
The most immediate impetus for the Commission's creation was
the Supreme Court's 1911 decisions in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States3 and the American Tobacco Co. v. United States. 4 In these
two Sherman Acts cases the Supreme Court enunciated the "rule of
reason" and held that only conduct which unreasonably restrains
trade is illegal. This standard, inasmuch as it left to the courts the
power to decide what particular practices constitute illegal restraints
of trade, was deemed too uncertain by Congress and the business
community.° In addition, the enforcement history of the Sherman Act
up to 1911 had . been criticized by some cornmentators, 1 and the courts
did not appear to view Sherman Act proceedings with particular
1 For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the political and legislative history of
the Federal Trade Commission, see G. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 1-48
(3d ed. 1927).
2 U.S. Const. art. I, $ S empowers Congress "To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States . . . ."
8 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
4 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The Sherman Act declares illegal "every" contract in restraint
of trade and makes monopolization or attempts to monopolize a misdemeanor.
6 Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 ABA Antitrust Section 14,
21 (1964).
7 Id. at 19.
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favor. 8 Thereafter, several years of legislative effort culminated in the
enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Acts and its companion
bill, the Clayton Act." The former established the Federal Trade
Commission and the latter was aimed at clarifying the "rule of
reason" by attempting to define specific practices deemed anticom-
petitive. The new commission was given the task of defining "unfair
methods of competition in commerce," and the authority to issue
cease and desist orders prohibiting practices it found to be such
"unfair methods of competition."
From the time the need for a trade commission was first per-
ceived there existed a dichotomy of views as to its appropriate func-
tions. One school of thought, to which President Wilson, one of the
Commission's strongest supporters, belonged, envisioned the function
of such a commission as providing advice for the business community,
the Executive, and the Congress. On the basis of its fact-finding
abilities, for which it should be given the broadest possible investi
gatory powers, the Commission was to make recommendations for
legislation to the Congress and generally report on existing trade con-
ditions. The grant of quasi-judicial authority was not contemplated by
this school of thought." In principle the new commission was to take
over, in expanded form, the functions and existing programs of the
Bureau of Corporations of the Department of Commerce and Labor."
One of the major advantages of the new commission was that it was
an independent agency under the supervision of Congress rather than
the executive department, as had been the Bureau of Corporations. The
"regulatory" activities of the new commission were to be merely ad-
visory. This school of thought also contended that publicity in and
of itself would be a deterrent to anticompetitive behavior.
The second school of thought advocated a commission with reg-
ulatory as well as quasi-judicial authority." This view reflected not
only dissatisfaction with judicial interpretations but also with the
choice of cases brought by the Attorney General. It was argued that
the regulation of commerce should reflect a continuous policy based
on a body of precedents, and not subject to changing political fortunes
citated by White House occupancy. This gave added impetus to the
concept that such a commission should be independent from executive
8 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9 15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq. (1964).
10 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1964).
11 According to President Wilson, the Commission was to substitute "counsel and
accommodation for the harsher processes of legal restraint . . . ." 16 Bureau of Nat'l
Literature, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 8158 (Supp. 1917).
12 The Bureau of Corporations was created in 1903 and those programs in existence
in 1914 were continued by the Federal Trade Commission.
13 See G. Henderson, supra note 1, at 20-23.
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control, and that this quasi-judicial power would remove some of the
prior uncertainties inherent in judicial proceedings. The independent
status of the agency was established at the time not solely for juris-
prudential reasons, but also to provide for the regulation of trade on
a continuous basis beyond direct executive control." Little thought
was given to the fact that legislation enacting a commission exercising
quasi-judicial functions on the basis of such a broad mandate as a
part of the executive branch of the government would in all probabil-
ity have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court under
the separation of powers doctrine.'
Inasmuch as support for the commission came from different quar-
ters and for different reasons," expressions as to the functions of the
new commission were equally divergent. It is difficult to determine a
clear and specific description of its duties from the legislative history.
It has been correctly observed that the "[c]hronicles of the 1914 leg-
islative year in the Sixty-Third Congress are, perhaps understandably,
confused, inconsistent and unusually uninformative."" Too great a re-
liance on congressional and other pronouncements may therefore be
misleading. Nevertheless, the underlying theme of the commission's
creation was dissatisfaction with things as they were, and it was left
to the Commission to develop the solutions.
B. Legislative Grants of Authority
1. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The Commission's grant of legislative authority is as diverse as
it is broad. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares
unlawful "unfair methods of competition in commerce" and directs
the Commission to issue a complaint's whenever it has reason to be-
lieve that an unfair method of competition is being used and a proceed-
14 This was expressed on the floor of the House of Representatives in the following
manner:
And instead of giving additional power to the Attorney General we should .. .
create a great, independent, non-partisan commission independent of the Presi-
dent, independent of Cabinet Officers, removed so far as possible from partisan
politics, that would command the respect and confidence of all parties and of
all the people of the Nation.
51 Cong. Rec. 8857 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Morgan).
15 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
10 The business interests supported the Commission
not only upon the expectation that such a commission would administer a policy
more tolerant toward large aggregations of capital, but on the belief that it could
give to a group of businessmen, in advance, authoritative advice as to the legality
of a contemplated undertaking.
G. Henderson, supra note 1, at 21.
17 Votaw, supra note 6, at 25.
18 15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq. (1964). As does the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), the
Federal Trade Commission Act permits resale price maintenance. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2).
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ing would be in the public interest. A finding, subsequent to a hearing,
that unfair methods of competition had in fact been used was to result
in a cease and desist order prohibiting the future use of the practices.
In 1938, section 5 was amended to include "unfair or deceptive acts
and practices" within its proscription." The amendment was occa-
sioned20 by the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Raladam Co., 21
where the Court held that "[ul nf air trade methods are not per se un-
fair methods of competition, 122 thereby requiring a showing of com-
petitive injury for a finding of violation. The case involved alleged
misrepresentations of the efficacy of an obesity cure. As in many pre-
vious cases, the Commission's opinion recited, rather perfunctorily,
that the practice under consideration is "to the prejudice of the public
and respondent's competitors,' even though no actual evidence of
competitive injury had been introduced. With the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment the necessity to make a finding of competitive injury was
eliminated in those cases involving misrepresentations of a product
or service.
The Amendment contained another important revision of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. In its original form the act required
the Commission to apply to a United States Court of Appeals for the
enforcement of Commission cease and desist orders. Under the
Amendment, however, the Commission's orders were made final and
enforceable 60 days after their issuance unless apealed by the re-
spondent to a United States Court of Appeals. 24 Finally the Amend-
ment provided that violations of final orders were subject to civil
penalties "of not more than $5,000 for each violation" to "be re-
covered in a civil action by the United States."
To assist it in its tasks, the Commission was initially given broad
investigatory powers, including the right of access to corporate rec-
ords, issuance of subpoenas and the authority to require the com-
pletion of special reports.' In view of the different types of inves-
tigations authorized by the Act these powers continue to be consider-
able importance, and furthermore the Commission's investigatory
authority is not limited to suspected violations of law but the Act
19 Wheeler-Lea Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964), amending ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719
(1914).
20 See 80 Cong. Rec. 6590 (1936) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
21 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
22
 Id. at 649.
23 Raladam Co., 12 F.T.C. 363, 369 (1929).
24 A similar amendment was passed in 1959 with respect to Clayton Act orders.
15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964), amending ch. 323, § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914).
25 For a detailed discussion of this power, see Withrow, Investigatory Powers of the
Federal Trade Commission—Constitutional and Statutory Limitation, 24 Fed. B.J. 456
(1964). See also Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade
Commission, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 70S (1928).
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empowers the Commission to collect information under the threat
of compulsory process for purely administrative purposes.'
2. The Clayton Act
The Clayton Act attempts to provide the specificity deemed
missing from the Sherman Act by outlawing particular practices. The
Act's major prohibitions are aimed at injurious and unjustified price
discriminations, tie-in sales, exclusive dealing, mergers and interlock-
ing directorates. In addition, it permits private plaintiffs to recover
treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws and provides for the
government to seek criminal penalties. Jurisdiction to enforce the Act
rests with both the Commission and the Department of Justice. The
chief aim of the law is elimination of price discrimination, which is
a potent weapon in the hands of the large firm and would-be monopo-
list. For example, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,27 the argument
was advanced before the Supreme Court that the Standard Oil trust
should not be broken up because it had acquired its position in large
measure as a result of lawful means—the practice of price discrimina-
tion."
The effects of the new legislation, however, did not measure up
to expectations. The price discrimination proscription, due to its
provision permitting different prices for purchases of different quan-
tities, and for other reasons," proved less than satisfactory, and
enforcement endeavors were disappointing." As a result, in 1936
Congress amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act. 3 ' The amendment
considerably narrowed the defense provisos of section 2 and added
new substantive prohibitions. Dummy brokerage fees were outlawed
and advertising allowances and payments for other merchandising
services could be paid only if made available on proportionally equal
terms to competing purchasers. The knowing inducement or accep-
tance of a discrimination in price was also prohibited by the Act. The
provisions dealing with advertising allowances and merchandising
services were intended to close a serious loophole under the original
26 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
27 211 U.S. 1 (1911).
28 Id. at 84.
29 For example, payments or allowances for bogus advertising and promotional
services apparently did not fall within the proscription of the law, see 80 Cong. Rec. 6282
(1936) (remarks of Senator Logan).
80
 AU 3 price discrimination cases to reach the courts before 1936 were reversed.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557
(1939) ; National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F. 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613
(1924) ; Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774 (2d Cir 1922), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 759 (1923).
81 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), amending ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730
(1914).
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Section 2 of the Act. 32 It was found that one of the favorite methods
of evading the price discrimination proscription was through pay-
ments or allowances for advertising and other promotional services
which were either not rendered at all or rendered in insufficient
value.' To the extent that such payments were no more than dis-
guised price discriminations, these provisions sought to bring them
out into the open by making the prohibitions absolute. Thus, no
showing of competitive injury is required for the establishment of a
prima facie case under these provisions." The law represents an effort
by Congress to place competing purchasers as nearly as possible on an
equal footing.35
The next significant extension of the Commision's statutory
authority came in the form of an amendment to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The original section provided that
no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition between [the two corpora-
tions], or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of com-
merce 3e
This prohibition, perhaps more than any other in the antitrust laws,
directly represented congressional concern with increased economic
concentration and was aimed at preventing the formation of monop-
olies. 37 However, since the law was limited to the acquisition of a
32 See 80 Cong. Rec. 6282 (1936) (remarks of Senator Logan).
83 Senator Logan indicated that fraudulent advertising allowances had
been indulged in to . . an enormous extent. . .. Legitimate allowances for
advertising ... may be made, but allowances must not be made for the purpose
of giving the purchaser an opportunity to buy goods at a lower price than others
similarly situated buy them.
Id.
34 Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
85 For valuable discussions regarding various aspects of this law, including price
discrimination, see W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act (1938) ; L. Austin, Price
Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act (1952); C.
Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law (1959); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under
the Robinson-Patman Act (1962).
86 Clayton Act, ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
87 The Senate Judiciary Committee characterized the proposed Clayton Act as follows:
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies,
seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule,
singly and in themselves, are not covered by the Act of July 2, 1890 [the
Sherman Act] or other existing antitrust acts and thus, by making these practices
illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their
incipiency. .
S. Rep. No. 695, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
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corporation's stock, its intent was readily circumvented by the acqui-
sition of a corporation's assets. In a 1926 decision, the Supreme Court
held that not even the acquisition of assets based upon an illegal
acquisition of stock came within the law's proscription.' The Supreme
Court sounded the death knell in a 1934 opinion holding that if the
assets of a corporation whose stock had been illegally acquired were
absorbed between the time the complaint issued and a final order of
divestiture, the law did not apply." The only case successfully
prosecuted under the original section 7 was a proceeding brought
against the Aluminum Company of America after it had acquired its
only competitor." This statutory loophole and these adverse court
decisions caused the Commission to abandon section 7 enforcement
endeavors.4
This disastrous enforcement experience, and the Commission's
report on merger activities,42 pursuaded Congress to close the loop-
hole in the 1950 amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act by
making it applicable to the acquisition of assets as well as stock."
3. Consumer Statutes
Over the years Congress has passed other important legislation,
mainly in the consumer field, the enforcement of which has been
entrusted to the Commission. These acts include the Wool Products
Labeling Act," the Fur Products Labeling Act,' the Flammable
38 In FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926), the Court held that the
Act has no application to .
 ownership of a competitor's property and business
obtained prior to any action by the Commission, even though this was brought
about by stock unlawfully held.
39 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
40 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 F. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261
U.S. 616 (1923).
41 See FTC, Report on the Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions 3
(1947):
The economic effect of the loophole in the statute was to create a striking
anomaly. A premium was placed upon the attainment of monopolistic ends by
the completely final method of consolidation [commingling of assets], as against
the weaker more vulnerable method of cooperation among different firms [stock
control and ownership].
42 FTC, Report on the Merger Movement: A Summary Report (1948).
43 The Act now provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share of capital and no corporation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
44 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1964).
48 15	 § 69 (1964).
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Fabrics Act," the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 47 the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act's and the Consumer Credit Protection
Act (Truth-in-Lending)." The reference to these laws as "consumer
statutes" does not and should not mean that the antitrust statutes are
excluded from that description. Some legislation is clearly of more
immediate impact on the consumer in a relatively narrow framework.
However, the Sherman Act of 1890 was the first consumer statute
of an extremely broad nature, for the Act is designed at least im-
plicity to protect the consumer against his greatest threat—monop-
oly. Under monopolistic conditions there would be little need for
the present type of consumer protection, which, in part, is occasioned
by the fact that some degree of competition, in whatever form, does
exist. Ultimately, all else being equal, the best protection the consumer
can receive, irrespective of political considerations concerning eco-
nomic concentration and basic elements of fairness, is protection from
exorbitant prices. This is best demonstrated by a recent case in-
volving a price-fixing conspiracy between the Seattle, Washington
bread bakeries. There it was found that due to the price-fixing con-
spiracy the consumer paid 19 percent in excess of the national average
for his bread. Subsequent to Commission intervention, 5" the con-
spiracy collapsed and prices eventually settled at slightly below the
national average.s' Although in other instances Commission inter-
vention appears to result in higher consumer prices, these would at
best be temporary and in the long run are outweighed by the public
interest in the preservation of a healthy competitive climate. An ex-
ample of such a situation is gasoline price wars, which, if allowed to
persist, ultimately result in the elimination of the independent petro-
46 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq. (1964).
47 15 U.S.C. § 70 et seq. (1964).
48 15 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
`b/ 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1671-77 (Supp. 1969). In addition, the Com-
mission must take into account, and exercise varying degrees of responsibility under, a
host of other statutes. These include the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1001 et seq. (1964); the Automobile Information Disclosure Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1231 et seq. (1964); the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15
U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969); the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of
1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1964); the Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 521 et seq. (1964); the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (Supp. IV, 1969); the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
(1964); the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1964);
the McGuire Resale Price Maintenance Act of 1952, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1964) ; the
Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act of 1937, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); and the
Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. § 61 et seq. (1964).
5° See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966).
51 FTC, Economic Report on the Baking Industry (1968) (summarized in 3 Trade
Reg. Rep. If 10,370).
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leum refineries, which at present account for much, if not all, of the
price competition in that industry.' 2
II. PROBLEMS OF ESTABLISHING ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES:
CONSCIOUS CHOICE AND PURSUIT OF PUBLIC POLICY
When the Commission began operations in 1915, it was unsure
of the specifics of its mission. The organic act as finally passed dif-
fered considerably in a number of respects from what had been indi-
cated by previous expressions as to its expected content. The most
notable addition was the grant of quasi-judicial authority. If a uniform
purpose can be extracted from the legislative history, it is that of
flexibility in enforcement, unhampered by historical impediments.
As one of its first activities, the Commission held conferences
and solicited views as to where it should concentrate its attention."
The advice received was diverse; however, two dominant viewpoints
did emerge. The first urged the Commission to make itself available
to the individual businessman for the purpose of advising him as to the
legality of a particular course of action.' Although it was recognized
that the Act did not provide for such personalized service, the legis-
lative history and other pronouncements leading to the creation of
the Commission were thought to justify the suggestion." Others,'
notably Louis Brandeis, who was a long-time advocate of the estab-
lishment of a trade commission, strongly opposed such a procedure.
He pointed out that such advice in all likelihood would be based on.
insufficient facts and hence maximize the possibility of a mistake.
Brandeis also believed that the Commission would be "hoodwinked"
by businessmen, many of whom would merely want to know how
close they could come to violating the law without being prosecuted."
The principal function of the Commission, as Brandeis saw it, was
fact-finding and the definition, by the process of judicial exclusion and
inclusion, of those trade practices which constitute unfair methods
of competition.
These conferences did not help the Commission in the estab-
lishment of meaningful enforcement priorities or in pinpointing
52 FTC, Report on Anticompetitive Practices in the Marketing of Gasoline (1967)
(summarized in 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 10,373).
53 "To get its bearings, the new Commission held numerous informal conferences
with various business groups." Dixon, The Federal Trade Commission: The First Fifty
Years, 24 ABA Antitrust Section 29, 33 (1964).
54 See letter from Gilbert H. Montague to the Federal Trade Commission, June 25,
1915, on file in the National Archives,
55 See Bureau of Nat'l Literature, supra note 11, at 8158.
56 Address by Louis D. Brandeis, Federal Trade Commission Hearings, April 30,
1915, on file in the National Archives. The Commission first began rendering formal
advisory opinions in 1962.
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specific areas for Commission action, although they did serve to
crystallize some procedural aspects. Over the years the question of
priorities has been the single most troublesome issue facing the Com-
mission. Every major study conducted about the Commission, to vary-
ing degrees, is critical of the Commission's choice of priorities and
its procedures. Typically, the charge is made that too much of the
Commission's time and money is spent on "trivia." As early as 1924,
and only nine years after the Commission began to operate, it was
observed that
[t]he Commission is handling too many cases, and that it
should exercise a greater discretion in selecting those cases
which involve questions of public importance. It does not
seem necessary that public funds should be employed to
prosecute cases . . . involving trivial or merely technical of-
fenses, in which the public interest is not always easy to
discern.57
Over the years this criticism was echoed by others, including the
Hoover Commission," the Landis Report," and most recently the
1969 report prepared for the American Bar Association." The last-
mentioned study states that
[m] any of the present problems of the FTC—including al-
location of resources, commitment of time and effort to rel-
atively trivial matters, and extensive delay in the investiga-
tional stage of agency action—are traceable to a considerable
extent to the fundamental failure to establish goals and priori-
ties and to implement effective planning controls consis-
tent with these goals and priorities."
Much of this type of criticism continues and, though at times
overstated, needs to be considered. Over the years the establishment
of meaningful priorities and enforcement goals has often proven to
be an elusive objective. Being governed by a consortium of five, the
57 G. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 337 (3d ed. 1927).
58 The Hoover Commission Report stated that
[i]n the selection of cases for its formal dockets, the Commission has long been
guilty of prosecuting trivial and technical offenses and of failing to confine these
dockets to cases of public importance.
Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess., Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions, app. N, 128 (Comm. Print 1949)
[hereinafter cited as Hoover Commission Report].
50 J. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960).
60
 ABA, Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission
(1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
01 ABA Report 77.
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decision-making process is, of necessity, often a matter of compromise.
While this may not always be apparent, it is particularly relevant
when the Commission is composed of personalities, each of whom
feels strongly about the direction of the Commission's enforcement
activities. Ironically, the stronger and more dedicated the views, the
more difficult it may become to reach agreement on enforcement
priorities.
A brief outline of the manner in which the Commission is moved
to action may be helpful in illustrating the process of establishing
enforcement priorities. Action by the Commission is initiated basi-
cally in three ways: by application for complaint by the general public
or a governmental agency; on its own motion; or upon the direction
of the President or Congress.' The last method is almost never used;
the last time an investigation was directed by Congress was in 1938. 03
The last President to direct the Commission to undertake an in-
vestigation was President Truman who in 1952 directed the Com-
mission to launch a special investigation "to give us a breakdown of
the consumer's dollar."" As a practical matter, this leaves the Com-
mission to act on its own accord or pursuant to applications for com-
plaint by the general public—the so-called "mail bag" approach. No
adequate and conclusive breakdown as to the Commission's actions
in response to either of the two methods has been made. Based on
the authors' knowledge, however, the mail bag approach probably
accounts for far less than 50 percent of the Commission's activities,
and has found its principal application in the deceptive practices
area." The method's importance, and its shortcomings as well, have
been greatly exaggerated. The mail bag is a fairly accurate barometer
of those practices which are considered by businessmen, the con-
sumer and other governmental agencies as being violative of one of
the Commission-administered laws. While the Commission should
not, and cannot act on each application for complaint it receives, it
62
 Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Ad authorizes the President or either
House of Congress to direct the initiation of an investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1964).
A rider to the 1934 appropriations bill amended this section to require a concurrent resolu-
tion of Congress. 15 U.S.C. § 46a (1964).
Ca H.R. Doc. No. 468, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939). See also 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 89.
The Commission may, of course, initiate an investigation pursuant to a congressional
request but it is not required to do so.
64 See Boyle, Economic Reports and the Federal Trade Commission: 50 Years Ex-
perience, 24 Fed. B.J. 489, 501 (1960). See also 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 80.
65 For example, in fiscal 1969, in the deceptive practices area a total of 192 investiga-
tions were initiated. Of these, 74 were originated by the Commission; the rest originated
by applications for complaint, broken down as follows: Consumers-84, Congress-19,
Federal Government-6, Better Business Bureaus and Chambers of Commerce-6, State or
Local Governments-3.
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has the duty to consider such communications when it establishes
priorities and enforcement goals.
In allocating its enforcement resources, the Commission also must
be mindful of the immediate impact of a particular practice. In the
deceptive practices area it may have a 'choice between prohibiting a
deception affecting millions of people in a minor way and a scheme
robbing relatively few of their life savings. For example the Com-
mission must determine whether to give priority to a television com-
mercial seen by 30 million people of a product which perhaps does
not quite perform as advertised or to the home improvement fraud
making paupers out of a few hundred. A decision to proceed, based
purely on the amount of dollars and cents and impact upon the
general public as a whole, in such a situation would be totally in-
adequate.
One particular example illustrates some aspects of the priority
problem. The enormous growth in the use of credit spawned the forma-
tion of companies engaged in the collection of debts and related activi-
ties. It is estimated that today there are over 2,000 companies engaged
in debt collection activities. Being a young industry, it is characterized
by easy entry and it consists of many small businesses. The industry
came to the Commission's attention because many of its members
were engaged in deceptive practices in their efforts to collect
debts or in selling information to aid others in collecting debts.
For example, the most widespread and objectionable practice (as well
as the most effective from the collection agencies' point of view) is the
threat of legal action against a debtor when no such action is con-
templated." Although in a majority of instances the practices of any
one industry member might be of negligible impact and might not
satisfy the public interest prerequisite to Commission action, collec-
tively the impact is considerable and the public interest very decidedly
warrants action. This is especially true since the industry is growing
and beginning to experience consolidation, resulting in larger busi-
nessess.
In view of the large variety of deceptive debt collection practices
and the number of industry members involved, the Commission de-
cided to issue guides covering the conduct of collection agencies, both
in relation to debtors and creditors, rather than proceed against indi-
08 Other misrepresentations in the debt collection area include representations that
the information on the debtor is sought for a survey, that the information is sought for
cast selection for a motion picture, that a sum of money or prize will be sent if the
requested information is furnished, and that the documents are legal process forms when
they are not. Debt collection agencies have also represented themselves to be credit
bureaus. The reason for these practices is to disguise the nature of the communication
and to mislead the recipient as to its purpose. See FTC, Guides Against Debt Collection
Deception, 16 C.F.R. § 237 (1967).
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vidual firms on a case-by-case basis.' Subsequent to the promulga-
tion and effective date of the guides," extensive efforts were made to
place a copy of them in the hands of every industry member. After
allowing a reasonable period of time for industry members to bring
their practices into conformity with the guides, a survey was under-
taken to determine the degree of compliance.
It is at this point that the enforcement scheme is put to its great-
est test. Generally, those companies which have failed to bring their
practices into conformity with the guides are permitted to file an
assurance of voluntary compliance wherein discontinuance of the
challenged practices is promised. In the case of extremely flagrant
violations, formal enforcement procedures resulting in an order to
cease and desist will be initiated." A number of relatively small and
local companies, however, with minimal interstate commerce, have
refused to comply with the guides; in these cases under ordinary
circumstances the public interest would not warrant pursuit of the
matter. Yet, the existence of the guides and their effective and equi-
table enforcement require a far greater extent of compliance than
when no guides have been issued. While such a program unquestion-
ably leads to temporary surges in enforcement activities which would
probably be unjustified on a more permanent basis, it is precisely for
this reason that initial efforts must be aimed at total compliance to
prevent either a collapse of the program or additional commitment of
enforcement resources in the future.
In discussing some of the more practical aspects of the establish-
ment of meaningful priorities and enforcement goals, it should be
noted that Congress has passed a number of technical statutes, notably
the various labeling acts, the enforcement of which has been entrusted
to the Commission. The "Nader" Study of the Commission's enforce-
ment priorities for example, leveled criticism at the Commission's
alleged over-concern with the Fur, Textile, Wool and Flammable Fab-
07
 Industry guides are promulgated by the Commission on its own initiative or
pursuant to petition ... when it appears to the Commission that guidance as to
the legal requirements applicable to particular practices would be beneficial in
the public interest and would serve to bring about more widespread and equitable
observance of the laws administered by the Commission.
FTC, Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1969). In addition, the guides
provide the basis for voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of unlawful
practices by members of industry. Failure to comply with the guides may result
in corrective action by the Commission under applicable statutory provisions.
FTC, Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1969).
68 FTC, Guides Against Debt Collection Deception, 16 C.F.R. § 237 (1969).
69
 For present purposes, the chief difference between the two is that a violation of
a cease and desist order may subject the company to a civil penalty proceeding whereas
no such sanction accompanies an assurance of voluntary compliance. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(i)
(1964).
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ric Labeling Acts." In an overall sense, it is not the Commission's
function to substitute its own judgment for that of Congress' as
to those laws deemed worthy of enforcement. Nor is congressional
expression of concern over truthful labeling of products or services
devoid of recent examples.71 Congressional rationale for this concern
undoubtedly rests on the belief that a healthy competitive market
economy depends upon consumers being able to make informed and
rational choices between competing products and services free of fraud
and deception. The ultimate purpose of these labeling laws is to inform
consumers and enable them to make a rational choice based upon
accurate information. By the same token, every time the consumer
avoids a purchasing mistake his expenses are correspondingly reduced.
Naturally, in its efforts to secure compliance with these labeling laws
the Commission is often required to process relatively minor viola-
tions. This is inevitable, although in some instances it may bear directly
on the enforcement credibility of the Commission. It does not alter,
however, the need for meaningful enforcement of these laws and the
fact that Congress annually appropriates funds earmarked for specific
areas of enforcement.
It is not suggested that more rational planning and establishing
of enforcement goals and priorities could not be realized by the Com-
mission. To fulfill its function adequately, the Commission must be-
come more responsive more quickly to the troublespots in the
economy. A partial blueprint for greater Commission effectiveness
was recently presented by the Commission of the American Bar Asso-
ciation to Study the Federal Trade Commission. That Commission's
report proposed
[t] he immediate expansion and reinvigoration of the Office of
Program Review to take principal responsibility for reporting
to the Commission on ways and means of coordinating future
agency operations. 72
To the extent that this proposal envisages review, along with recom-
mendations on every proposal involving commitment of Commission
resources, it would appear to be highly desirable. The report, however,
further recommends that Bureau Directors, Assistant Directors,
"personnel even further down the line," 73 and the field offices" be
70 See 115 Cong. Rec. E 373-74 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1969) (remarks of Senator Nelson).
71 In 1967, Congress passed the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1451
et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969) and in 1969, the Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth-in-
Lending), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601-13, 1631-41, 1671-77 (Supp. 1969).
72 ABA Report 78.
73 Id. at 83.
74 Id. at 84.
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delegated the authority to issue complaints. Assuming that the statu-
tory authority for such a delegation exists, 75 and that the power to
issue complaints should be exercised by someone other than, or in
addition to, the Commission, it would seem that the proposed diffusion
of power would greatly weaken any attempts to establish priorities
and enforcement goals. In the event it were deemed advisable to ex-
pand the power to issue complaints, it would be preferable to delegate
it to a particular official, such as the General Counsel, rather than
scatter it throughout the Commission. That way at least the commit-
ment of resources could be coordinated between the Program Review
Officer and the General Counsel along established lines of priorities.
In the final analysis, however, the responsibility for action, as well as
for inaction, must and should rest with the Commission. The diffusion
of responsibility would not only hinder the establishment of priorities
but also unnecessarily undermine the effectiveness of the Commission.
One method of establishing priorities which has not been suffi-
ciently explored by the Commission is the cost-benefit analysis along
economic lines. While it is no panacea relative to priority problems
this procedure would focus on those areas in which the enforcement
dollar could achieve the greatest benefit for the public. The applica-
tion of this technique would be particularly beneficial in the restraint
of trade area, and is also capable of successful application in the de-
ceptive practices area. Certainly such an approach could be used to
minimize the tendency to deal with violations on an ad hoc basis rather
than in the context of the overall market structure.
Whatever approach is used, it is clear that the Commission must
take a more active part in the shaping of a competitive economy. All
too often the Commission merely reacts to problems once they occur,
which may have the effect of committing enforcement resources to
areas where none would be required if a more foresighted and imag-
inative policy had been pursued. Prevention of the breakdown of the
competitive process, as distinguished from attempts to cure a break-
75 Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides in part:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person
... has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive
act or practice in commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a
proceeding by it would be in the interest of the public, it shall issue . . . a com-
plaint .... [Emphasis added.]
But see Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961 which provides for the delegation of the Com-
mission's functions within its discretion.
In addition to its existing authority, the . . . Commission . • . shall have the
authority to delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions to a division
of the Commission, an individual Commissioner, a bearing examiner, an employee
or employee board . . . .
5 U.S.C. $ 133z-15 (1964).
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down once it has occurred, would dramatically increase the Com-
mission's effectiveness.
III. THE COMMISSION'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
A. The Executive Branch
1. The President
As conceived, the Commission was to be as free as possible from
the influence and control of the President. Initially, there were only
two ways in which the President had any direct influence over the
Commission. The first was the President's power to appoint Com-
missioners with the advice and consent of the Senate. To reduce the
impact of this influence the terms of Commissioners were staggered
and extended for a period of seven years.
In 1933 the question arose whether the President could also
remove a commissioner. President F. D. Roosevelt removed Commis-
sioner Humphrey because the latter was openly opposed to the Presi-
dent's economic policies, which he wanted to pursue, at least in part,
through the Commission. The dispute reached the Supreme Court on
the issue whether the President could remove a commissioner of an
independent agency solely because of differing points of view. In a
landmark decision the Supreme Court held that he could not." In
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized the quasi-judicial nature
of the Commission, which under the consitutional separation of func-
tions doctrine requires freedom from the control or the influence of
the President.
We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable
power of removal is not possessed by the President . . .. The
authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their
duties independently of executive control cannot well be
doubted; and that the authority includes, as an appropriate
incident, power to fix the period during which they shall con-
tinue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in
the meantime. For it is quite evident that one who holds his
office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be de-
pended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against
the latter's will.' 7
Thus, the Court specifically recognized the need for independence
76 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
77 Id. at 629.
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from executive control of agencies exercising quasi-judicial func-
tions."
The second source of presidential influence is the President's
authority to direct the Commission to initiate investigations and report
to him." Although this authority contains the potential for consider-
able presidential control and influence over the Commission, it has
been used sparingly. The most popular subject of such investigations
was prices, in particular food prices, during the World Wars. For
example, President Wilson, as a wartime emergency measure, directed
the Commission "to investigate and report the facts relating to the
production, ownership, manufacture, storage and distribution of food-
stuffs" and "to ascertain the facts bearing on alleged violations of
the antitrust acts.' Many of the reports submitted pursuant to presi-
dential directives had great influence in the formulation and passage
of important legislation." However, there has not been a presiden-
tially directed investigation since 1952. In that year President Truman
directed the Commission "to launch a special investigation to give us
a breakdown of the consumer's dollar."" Congressional action, how-
ever, in the form of a rider to the 1953 appropriations bill, blocked the
investigation."
Since passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act a number of
events have significantly broadened the relationship of the President
to the Commission. In 1921 the Budget and Accounting Act" created
the Bureau of the Budget, and required that requests for appropria-
tions of all governmental agencies with the exception of the legislative
and judicial branches must be channeled through, and reviewed by,
the Bureau of the Budget. This was deemed "necessary to wipe out
duplications in the Government service, to eliminate inefficiency, and
78 The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by Congress
to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with
the legislative standard therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties
as a legislative or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are performed
without executive leave and, in contemplation of the statute, must be free from
executive control.
Id. it. u28.
79 Section 6(d) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1964),
provides that the Commission shall have the power "fulpon the direction of the President
. to investigate and report the facts relating to any alleged violations of the antitrust
Acts . . . ."
90 See 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 85.
81 See, e.g., the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 7 et seq. (1964).
Commission influence in this legislation was attributable to the FTC's, Food Investiga-
tion—Report on the Meat Packing Industry (1918-19). See 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 84.
82 Boyle, supra note 64, at 501.
83 Act of July 31, 1953, ch. 302, 1, 67 Stat. 301, provided in part "Mhat no part
of the foregoing shall be available for a statistical analysis of the consumer's dollar."
84 31 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
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to stop unnecessary work." 88 The question of the resulting presidential
control or influence over independent agencies was not raised at the
time the Act was passed, perhaps because the Bureau of the Budget
was originally a part of the Treasury Department and therefore was
somewhat further removed from the President than it is today. It was
not until 1939 that the Bureau was placed directly under the Presi-
dent." The progressive expansion of the President's power over the
preparation of the national budget has increased his influence over the
operation of all the independent agencies. This influence does not
terminate when the budget becomes law since the Bureau must au-
thorize expenditures at quarterly intervals and determine by direct
investigation or Accounting Office inspection whether the agencies are
spending the funds for the purpose for which they were authorized.
Other important supervisory functions are exercised by the Bu-
reau of the Budget. The staggering growth of the government in the
three decades between 1912 and 1942 and its insatiable appetite for
information culminated in enactment of the Federal Reports Act of
1942.87 The Act provides that with minor exceptions all governmental
agencies must channel their requests for information through the
Bureau of the Budget." It was hoped that in this fashion unnecessary
and duplicative questionnaires and data collection activities could be
avoided. The Bureau's review of data collection activities is not only
aimed at the substance of the data, but also at the problem of improv-
ing the technical aspects of data gathering." Such review permits
extensive control over the investigative functions of the Commission
in that the Bureau is empowered to limit the collection of the informa-
tion sought.
In submitting questionnaires and other requests for information
to the Bureau for approval, the Commission distinguishes between
information sought for general statistical purposes and that sought for
law enforcement purposes. With respect to the latter category the
Commission takes the position that Bureau approval is not contem-
plated by the Act. A reading of the Act and its legislative history
seems to support this position, although the question is far from
settled. A case challenging the Commission's position arose in connec-
tion with an industry-wide investigation to uncover possible Clayton
Act violations in the apparel industry, in which the Commission had
issued numerous section 6(b) questionnaires." The section 6(b)
85 61 Cong. Rec. 980 (1921) (remarks of Congressman Good).
86
 Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. § 576 (1939).
87 5 U.S.C. § 139 (1964).
BB The Act only applies to requests for information directed to more than 9
respondents. 5 U.S.C. § 139e(c) (1964).
89 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 139a(a)-(b) (1964).
90
 Such questionnaires are issued pursuant to § 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commis-
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orders had not been submitted to the Bureau for approval, and two
companies maintained that the failure to obtain prior approval ren-
dered the orders unenforceable. Accordingly, in January, 1964, they
brought suit, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief."
In October, 1964, the Department of Justice, on behalf of the Com-
mission, filed motions for summary judgment and to dismiss the com-
plaint. The case has been pending since that time due to
the efforts of the Department of Justice to resolve the con-
flicting views of the Bureau of the Budget and other govern-
ment agencies regarding the scope of the Federal Reports
Act and the exemptions from the Bureau's "clearance"
procedures under the Act when agency investigations con-
cern law enforcement matters.'
The relationship between the Commission and the Bureau is also
affected by the practice under which recommendations for and re-
ports on proposed legislation are cleared through the Bureau prior
to submission to Congress. This practice originated during the 1930s,
apparently without the benefit of statutory authority. Such recom-
mendations and reports are reviewed in the light of policy objectives
which may or may not coincide with those of the Commission. Con-
trol or influence over the Commission by the Bureau results where
revisions of such recommendations or reports are effected at the
Bureau's behest—a not infrequent occurrence.
The President's own influence over the Commission was ex-
panded in 1950. Up until that time the custom had prevailed that
the Commissioners selected from among themselves a chairman on
an annual basis to serve as Primus inter pares. The Hoover Com-
mission, organized in 1947 to study efficiency in the operation of
government, recommended that the President be given the authority
to appoint the chairman. The purpose was to "enable the President
to obtain a sympathetic hearing for broader considerations of national
policy which he feels the commission should take into account.""
The recommendation was embodied in the Reorganization Plan No. 8
which became law in 1950. 04 The plan also provided that the chairman
should have the authority (1) to appoint and supervise personnel,"
(2) to distribute the work load among such personnel, and (3) to de-
sion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964). Failure to reply may result in a statutory fine of
$100 for each day of noncompliance, 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964).
01 Puritan Fashions Corp. v. FTC, Civil No. 70-64 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 10, 1964).
92 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 69-70.
93 Hoover Commission Report 32.
94 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (1964).
06
 Appointments to the major administrative units within the Commission, however,
require approval by a majority of the Commissioners.
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termine the use and expenditure of funds. Inasmuch as the chairman
now holds his position at the pleasure of the President, it is unlikely
that he will pursue policies contrary to those of the Chief Executive.
The power to appoint the chairman, together with the latter's admin-
istrative control, which was expanded in 1961, 96 provides the potential
for significant presidential influence over the agency.
2. The Department of Justice
One of the factors governing the Commission's relationship with
the Department of Justice is their concurrent jurisdiction with respect
to a number of statutory provisions. Extensive liaison activities and
a working agreement ensure that both do not cover the same territory.
This is especially important where there is a choice of proceeding
either under the criminal or the civil provisions of the antitrust laws.
Since the Commission is only empowered to proceed under the civil
provision, cases with criminal implications are routinely referred to
the Department. Although concurrent jurisdiction exists, rarely does
a conflict develop. In some areas such as the Robinson-Patman Act,
the Department has left enforcement exclusively to the Commission.
Conversely, the so-called "hard core" cases which could give rise to
a criminal proceeding, such as price-fixing, are traditionally handled
by the Department. These and other matters in which concurrent
jurisdiction exists are the subject of liaison communications. Pursuant
to an agreement formalized in 1948, each agency notifies the other
by an exchange of cards of an intention to initiate action in areas of
concurrent jurisdiction." Should a conflict develop, it is settled by
means of a joint conference.98
96 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961, 5 U.S.C. 1 133z-15 (1964).
97 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 376 n.53 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Att'y Gen. Rep.] describes the agreement as
a "systematic mutual exchange of information regarding pending anti-monopoly
investigations and of each new investigation at the time it is directed." It pro-
vided for creation of a "card system." These "cards are to be made in duplicate,
exchanged between the two offices and a file of such exchange cards retained in
each office . . . ." The agreement continues that "upon receipt of a card dis-
closing *** a new investigation has been directed, information to be conveyed
back as to whether or not any matter is pending in *** [the other] agency con-
cerning the specific party or parties, commodity and charges. Should there be no
matter pending *** the submitting agency can proceed without liaison. If . . . a
matter is pending, further liaison is to be effected .... However, nothing herein
contained shall in any way limit either agency in making an independent decision
as to what investigation it will undertake.
98 Beyond this formal agreement, an enforcement pattern has emerged from case
by case action. Thus apart from cases where Clayton Section 3 forms part of a
larger Sherman Act charge, the Department has brought only one case solely
under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Similarly, unless a Clayton Act Section
2 offense comprises an element of Sherman Act violation, the Division appar-
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Liaison activities, although sufficient under the agreement, have
been expanded over the years by an extension of the card exchange
system, the making available of investigative files, consultation be-
tween the agencies' economists, and periodic meetings between the
agencies' heads for the purposes of determining jurisdiction on the
basis of past experience, manpower and funds available, and the re-
medies available to the agencies." Similar observations are contained
in the recent ABA report, as well as the suggestion that
where issues of anticompetitive effects turn essentially on
complicated economic analysis, and where decided cases
have not yet succeeded in fashioning a clear line marking
the boundary between legal and illegal conduct, such matters
should generally be assigned to the FTC.'w
It appears that the grant of concurrent jurisdiction was more
accidental than a conscious design to have two governmental agencies
deal with similar problems. It is questionable whether this overlap
was intended by Congress when it established the Commission, as
there is nothing in the legislative history to so indicate. In fact, one
of the reasons for the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission
Act was to provide for the expeditious treatment of incipient trade
restraints. In theory, at least, there was no need for the extent of
jurisdictional overlap that exists today, for the Commission was to
move against trade restraints in their early stages. The Department
on the other hand was to concern itself with the mature monopoly.
The Commission's jurisdiction was intended to be of a more defini-
tional and experimental nature, that is, it was to determine or define
those practices which are inimical to fair competition. As stated by
Judge Learned Hand, one of the Commission's duties is "to dis-
cover and make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing
which the conscience of the community may progressively develop. ))101
The Commission's expertise and fact-finding authority were expected
to make it particularly suitable for this task, quite apart from its in-
tended independence from executive control.
Very early in the Commission's history two specific factors
impeded the original scheme and moved the Commission's activities
into the "concurrent jurisdiction" area. The first factor was the early
entiy recognizes Commission procedures are better suited to primary enforce-
ment of price discrimination bans.
Id. at 376.
09 Expansion of liaison activities was the result of specific suggestions to that effect
contained in the Att'y Gen. Rep. 376-77.
100 ABA Report 66.
101 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
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Commission's own uncertainty as to its mission. The second, and more
important factor, was the early court decisions severely limiting the
Commission's anticipated jurisdiction. For example, the first Com-
mission case to reach the Supreme Court, FTC v. Gratz, 1" held that
the words "unfair methods of competition"
are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore re-
garded as opposed to good morals because characterized by
deception, bad faith fraud or oppression, or as against public
policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder
competition or create monopoly.'"
The decision completely ignored the reason and congressional intent
underlying the Commission's creation—to prevent trade restraints in
their incipiency. This was pointed out by Justice Brandeis in his dis-
senting opinion in Gratz:
If [the Commission] discovered that any business concern
had used any practice which would be likely to result
in public injury—because in its nature it would tend to aid
or develop into a restraint of trade—the Commission was
directed to intervene, before anything should be done or con-
dition arise violative of the Anti-Trust Act.'
By limiting the Commission's jurisdiction to practices previously con-
sidered actionable, the Court probably caused the Commission to
move into the more clear-cut antitrust areas in which the Depart-
ment had jurisdiction. Hence the areas of their concurrent jurisdic-
tion were expanded.
a. Petitions for Certiorari and Subpoena Enforcement. The Com-
mission channels its requests for petitions for certiorari through the
Solicitor General of the Department of Justice, who is authorized by
statute to "conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme
Court . . . in which the United States is interested."' The Com-
mission's success during the past eight years in obtaining petitions
has been mediocre, for only slightly more than one half of its requests
for petitions for certiorari, 19 out of 34, were actually filed." Of the
14 petitions that were granted by the Court, all were ultimately de-
cided in favor of the Commission.
To the extent that the Solicitor General bases his decision whether
or not to file a petition for certiorari upon policy and enforcement
102 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
103 Id. at 427.
104 Id. at 435.
105 28 U.S.C.A. § 518 (1964).
106 This covers the period from July 1, 1961, through March 1, 1969.
745
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
priorities established by the Department, the advantages supposedly
accruing from the Commission's expertise become largely submerged
since differences of opinion are resolved in favor of the Solicitor
General. In evaluating the Commission's requests the Solicitor General
must of necessity rely upon the Department's various operational
divisions. When such a division—as, for example, the Antitrust Di-
vision—substitutes its judgment for that of the Commission, it alters
the Commission's enforcement scheme, frustrating, in some instances,
congressional intent. Under some circumstances this may amount to
de facto repeal of congressional action. The Commission's experience
in specific areas serves to demonstrate this point. While the Solicitor
General filed certiorari petitions in slightly more than one half of
the cases in which he was requested to do so during the last eight
years, he did so in only one third of the Commission's Robinson-
Patman cases. During the same time span, the Solicitor refused to
file petitions in the only two cases involving the Wool Products
Labeling Act. On the other hand, the Commission's three merger cases
during this period were all filed and successfully appealed."' Thus
it had been pointed out that
Mlle Solicitor General's power to deny authorization
to petition for certiorari raises fundamental questions con-
cerning his relationship to the regulatory agencies. His
power over the agencies' litigation substitutes executive for
judicial review, while his power to deny certiorari entails
foreclosure of the Court's own examination. 108
It is frequently pointed out that the need for agency indepen-
dence must be balanced against the danger of overloading the Court's
docket and the presentation of inconsistent positions. This argument
is not entirely valid, however, since the Court seems to manage with-
out a corollary position when dealing with nongovernmental appeals.
Nor is it necessarily the function of the Solicitor General to attempt
reconciliation of conflicting positions when regulatory agencies are
involved. If any balance is to be achieved, the underlying purposes of
creating independent agencies suggests that it be in favor of indepen-
dence as against priorities imposed by the Solicitor General.
In this context, a relatively recent development concerning sub-
poena enforcement should be mentioned. Pursuant to Section 9 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,' enforcement of subpoenas before
107 For a more detailed discussion of these and related matters, see Macintyre, The
Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 Fed. B.J. 1 (1969).
1" Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor
General, 78 Yale L.J. 1442, 1457 (1969).
109 Section 9 states that
in case of disobedience to a subpoena the Commission may invoke the aid of any
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the courts was traditionally handled by the Commission, and its
authority to do so had not been questioned." 1° In FTC v. Guignon,'"
however, the argument was advanced, and supported by an amicus
curiae brief of the Department of Justice, that the Commission did not
have the authority to seek enforcement of its own subpoenas except
with the aid and consent of the Attorney General. In upholding this
position the court relied upon the statutory language of Title 28, Sec-
tions 516 and 518 of the United States Code, which in substance pro-
vide that except "as otherwise authorized by law" litigation in which
the United States or an agency is a party or interested shall be con-
ducted by the Department of Justice. The phrase "as otherwise au-
thorized by law" was inserted during the codification of sections 516
and 518 and any intent to change pre-existing law was specifically dis-
avowed by Congress." 2 The Court, however, apparently failed to take
this into account in reaching its decision."' It is too early for an
assessment of the decision's practical impact, but the potential for
significant influence and control over the Commission's investigative
endeavors clearly exists.
b. Civil Penalty Proceedings. Section 16 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act provides that
[w] henever the Federal Trade Commission has reason to be-
lieve that any person, partnership, or corporation is liable
to a penalty under section 54 of this title or under subsection
(1) of section 45 of this title, it shall certify the facts to the
Attorney General, whose duty it shall be to cause appropri-
ate proceedings to be brought for the enforcement of the
provisions of such section or subsection.'"
Thus, in enforcing one of its cease and desist orders the Commission
is required to certify the pertinent facts to the Attorney General for
an enforcement proceeding. Although the statutory language is man-
datory, that is, once the facts have been certified, it is the duty of the
Attorney General "to cause appropriate proceedings to be brought,"
court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of documentary evidence. [Emphasis added.]
15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
110 See Withrow, Investigatory Power of the Federal Trade Commission—Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limitations, 24 Fed. B.J. 456 (1964).
111 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968).
112 H. Rep. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), stated that "[i]n codification
... the statute is intended to remain substantively unchanged."
118 In addition, the court failed to consider the significant difference between manda-
mus proceedings and subpoena enforcement and failed to consider the legislative history
of § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964). The issues are considered extensively in Judge Heaney's
dissenting opinion. 390 F.2d at 330-38. See also Macintyre, supra note 107.
114 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964).
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such cases must fit into the Department's own scheme of priorities.
Manpower and fund limitations almost dictate independent review
of the merits of the particular case by the Department. This not only
can but does effect the Commission's enforcement activities.
Commission certifications of civil penalty proceedings are ulti-
mately assigned to the local United States Attorneys. Such cases are
usually given relatively low priority and often encounter considerable
delays. Since the fact, and hence the date, of certification is not a
matter of public record, a detailed analysis of the delay problem
cannot be made. However, the effects of delay can be very serious.
In some instances the evidence of violation has become so stale that
in order to keep the case alive it must be reinvestigated, and even
this may not save the case since witnesses forget or disappear al-
together. A number of cases must therefore be dropped purely for
failure of expeditious prosecution. Moreover, by assigning these cases
to United States Attorneys, the expertise in antitrust and trade reg-
ulation law possessed by Commission attorneys is not put to its
fullest use. Thus, the statutory scheme for civil penalty proceedings
represents perhaps the weakest link in the Commission's enforcement
chain. Unquestionably, it would be preferable to have this function
exercised by the Commission.
B. The Courts
1. Section 5 and Judicial Review
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that
whenever the Commission has reason to believe that one of the laws
it administers has been violated and a proceeding would be in the
public interest, it shall issue a complaint, whereupon the respondent
shall have a right to appear and show cause why a cease and desist
order should not be entered.'" The same section provides for judicial
review of cease and desist orders issued by the Commission.'" It is
noteworthy that the Commission has not utilized the show cause route
in the substantive way in which it apparently was intended, pre-
sumably because the Act also requires the Commission to make
findings of fact. Perhaps it was felt that this requirement necessitated
the building of a record by the Commission rather than placing the
burden on the respondent to show why an order should not be issued.
It is also not clear whether the show cause route would be received
favorably by the courts.u 7
115 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
116
 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) et seq. (1964).
117 The Federal Trade Commission Act indicates that the respondent has the right
to "show cause why an order should not be entered by the Commission requiring such
person ... to cease and desist ......The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001
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Over the years the criteria for judicial review have become fairly
crystallized. As the Commission built up a body of precedents and the
courts began to recognize its expertise, they have become more in-
clined to defer to its judgment. Initially, however, early court deci-
sions frequently misconstrued the Commission's purpose. In the FTC
v. Grate" decision, the Supreme Court stated that conduct "never
heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized
by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public
policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder com-
petition or create monopolym' was not an unfair method of com-
petition. The Commission's decision was actually overturned, how-
ever, because the Court found the complaint defective in not alleging
competitive injury. The Court also took the position that the decision
as to what constitutes a violation of the law must ultimately be made
by the courts, thereby in large part ignoring the reasons for the Com-
mission's creation. Furthermore, as Justice Brandeis pointed out in
his dissent, section 5 was to apply before a monopoly had been ac-
quired, and not after, as implied by the majority.' 21
In the following decade the Commission, with some exceptions,
did not fare well in the courts. The first meaningful breakthrough
came in 1934, in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros.' 2 ' where the Court
stated:
[117] e cannot say that the Commission's jurisdiction
extends only to those types of practices which happen to
have been litigated before this Court.
Neither the language nor the history of the Act suggests
that Congress intended to confine the forbidden methods to
fixed and unyielding categories. . . . It would not have been
a difficult feat of draftsmanship to have restricted the op-
et seq. (1964), states that "[eixcept as statutes otherwise provide, the proponent of a
rule or order shall have the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1964). The "show
cause" provision of the Federal Trade Commission Act might come within the exception
of the Adminitrative Procedure Act. However, the Federal Trade Commission Act requires
the Commission to "state its findings as to the facts." 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). The
Act also provides that the "findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by the
evidence, shall be conclusive." 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). This clearly puts the burden on
the Commission to substantiate the findings of fact and consequently the burden of proof
as to the cease and desist order based on these findings of fact.
118 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
119 Id. at 427.
120 The majority stated:
The Complaint contains no intimation that Warren, Jones & Gratz did not prop-
erly obtain their ties and bagging as merchants usually do . . . nor is it alleged
that they held a monopoly of either ties or bagging or had the ability, purpose
or intent to acquire one.
Id. at 428.
121 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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eration of the Federal Trade Commission Act to those meth-
ods of competition in interstate commerce which are for-
bidden at common law or which are likely to grow into
violations of the Sherman Act, if that had been the purpose
of the legislation."
The Court recognized the intent of section 5 and its definitional
nature by extensive references to the legislative history and to FTC
v. Raladam Ca.' The Court reasoned that Congress advisedly
adopted a phrase not "of precise definition but the meaning and ap-
plication of which must be arrived at by what this Court elsewhere
has called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion.' " 1" The Court thus concluded that
fij] t is unnecessary to attempt a comprehensive definition
of the unfair methods which are banned, even if it were pos-
sible to do so. We do not intimate either that the statute
does not authorize the prohibition of other and hitherto un-
known methods of competition or, on the other hand, that
the Commission may prohibit every unethical competitive
practice regardless of its particular character or conse-
quences. New or different practices must be considered as
they arise in the light of the circumstance in which they are
employed.'
Once having determined that section 5 is to be interpreted broadly,
the next question is the extent of judicial review of Commission opin-
ions. In a 1927 decision,' the Supreme Court stated that the "weight
to be given to the facts and circumstances admitted, as well as the
inferences reasonably to be drawn from them is for the commis-
sion."" Today, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLR.13 12s is generally
cited for the proposition that the findings of the Commission, if sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, are conclusive. While
this is the accepted rule, many courts will do little more than pay lip
service to it and will not hesitate to review the record, not for the pur-
pose of determining the existence of substantial evidence, but in order
to draw their own conclusions. Similarly, the holding that "Courts will
122 Id. at 309-10.
123 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
124 291 U.S. at 312 [citations omitted].
125 Id. at 314.
120 FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927).
127 Id. at 63.
128 340 U.S. 474, 493-95 (1951).
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not substitute their judgment for that of the Commission" 12° is
frequently not observed.
2. Limitations on Remedial Power
Particularly with respect to the question of remedy and the scope
of the Commission's orders, the courts are inclined to exercise their
own judgment and be influenced by their own sense of equity. The
exception occurs in the instance of orders to cease and desist entered
by consent of the parties. In one civil penalty proceeding based upon
an alleged violation of a consent order, the defendant argued that
the proceeding was inappropriate because a consent order is not a final
order within the meaning of the Act. The Court disposed of this
argument with the following language:
[T]he claim that the order is not a final order for enforce-
ment purposes is without merit. Defendant agreed that "the
order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after
a full hearing." Moreover, enforcement procedure would be
frustrated if the Commission were powerless to enforce its
order by monetary penalties merely because its order was on
consent."°
On the whole, the Commission's record in the courts in recent
years has been quite good, particularly in the Supreme Court. There
is one area, however, in which it has always encountered considerable
resistance—civil penalty proceedings, which are brought in United
States District Courts. In civil penalty proceedings, the courts have
shown an extraordinary reluctance to assess significant penalties."'
Naturally, the courts should and usually do consider the financial
ability of the defendant to pay the penalty, especially when such re-
sources are limited.'" On the other hand, penalties are commonly so
small so as to be meaningless. In one unusual recent case, In re
129 DeCarter v. FTC, 244 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1957). See also Standard Distribs.,
Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1954), where the court held:
It was for it, not for us, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony in light of it all, conflicting or otherwise. Hav-
ing done so, the findings of the Commission, when, as here the record as a whole
gives them substantial support, arc final even though the evidence is so conflicting
that it might have supported the contrary had such finding been made. [Citations
omitted.]
139 United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
131 The Act provides for the assessment of civil penalties as high as 85,000 for viola-
tion of a cease and desist order. In cases of continuing failure to obey an order, each day
is deemed a separate offense. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964).
132 United States v. Universal Wool Batting Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. t 70,168, at
78,681 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1961).
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nolland Furnace Co., 1' a criminal contempt proceeding was initiated
by the Commission for "knowingly, willfully and intentionally" vio-
lating a 1959 cease and desist order.'" In upholding the allegation of
violation, the court sentenced the president of the company to 6
months imprisonment, fined the company $100,000 and two other
company officers $500 each. 135 Even though this is a noteworthy
case, the fine is not particularly large compared to the company's
sales of $30,000,000 in 1961.1" In the unusual penalty case, fines
range from $1,000 to $10,000, hardly adequate in most cases to con-
stitute a deterrent for future violations.
One further problem of enforcement should be briefly mentioned
—injunctions. Pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, 137 the Commission
is authorized to initiate a proceeding in a district court of the United
States, seeking to enjoin the dissemination of allegedly false ad-
vertising of food, drugs, medical devices or cosmetics pending the is-
suance of a complaint.' This authority has been frequently and
successfully used by the Commission, particularly with respect to
claims questioning the efficacy of drugs. But in 1963 the Commission
brought a proceeding against Sterling Drug, seeking to enjoin further
dissemination of allegedly false and misleading advertising of Bayer
aspirin. In denying the relief sought, the court stated that it could
"not grant a preliminary injunction unless it can find that the defend-
ants have, in fact, used a false advertisement.'" Until that time the
test for granting such a preliminary injunction had been whether
there was a reasonable cause to believe that the alleged violation
had occurred, and not whether in fact the law had been violated. Thus,
in FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co.,"° the court held:
We think, however, that it is fair to say that all the Com-
mission had to show was a justifiable basis for believing,
derived from reasonable inquiry or other credible inform-
ation, that such a state of facts probably existed as reason-
ably would lead the Commission to believe that the
defendants were engaged in the dissemination of false ad-
133 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
184 Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55 (1959), aff'd, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
135 341 F.2d at 555.
no See 295 F.2d at 302.
137 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
188 Similar injunction power is conferred on the Commission by § 7 of the Wool
Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 68e (1964); § 6 of the Flammable Fabrics Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1195(a) (1964); and § 8 of the Textile Fiber Products Indentification Act,
15 U.S.C. § 70f (1964).
no FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
140 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951). See also FTC v. Thomsen-King & Co., 109 F.2d
516, 519 (7th Cir. 1940).
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vertisements of a drug in violation of the act. . . . The Dis-
trict Court was not required to find the charges made to be
true, but to find reasonable cause to believe them to be
true."'
The distinction between whether an advertisement is in fact false or
whether there is reason to believe that it may be false is quite impor-
tant. In the Sterling Drug case; the court, by ruling that the advertis-
ing in fact was not false, decided a Commission proceeding before it
was ever tried. 142
 In effect, the court decided the merits of the pro-
ceeding and foreclosed the Commission from taking any further action
without adducing additional evidence.
In 1965 the Commission brought an injunctive proceeding to
bar consummation of the proposed acquisition of Bowman Dairy by
Dean Foods on the grounds that the merger would probably violate
the antitrust laws, and, if consummated, the Commission's ability to
enter an effective order would be seriously impaired due to the antic-
ipated commingling of assets. The proceeding was brought in the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit under the All Writs Act"'
The court dissolved a previously granted temporary restraining order,
stating that the Commission did not have the authority to institute
such a proceeding."' It seems that this result was reached because
at various times the Commission had unsuccessfully recommended
that Congress enact legislation specifically authorizing the Commis-
sion to seek preliminary injunctions to bar proposed mergers.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari"' and, in reversing the
lower court, stated:
It is therefore clear that the "proceedings" in the Con-
gress with reference to the authority of the Commission it-
self to issue or apply to the district courts for the issuance
of preliminary injunctions in merger cases have no relevance
whatever to the question before us. In short, Congress gave
no attention to the exercise of judicial power by the courts of
appeals under the All Writs Act, leaving that power intact
and the standing of the Commission to invoke it undimin-
ished. We thus hold that the Commission has standing to
141 191 F.2d at 747-48.
112 Although the Commission's complaint had issued, hearings had not begun at the
time the petition for an injunction was filed. 215 F. Supp. at 329.
143 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
144 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 F.2d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1966).
143 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 383 U.S. 901 (1966).
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seek preliminary relief from the Court of Appeals under the
circumstances alleged."'
In a previous instance where the Commission had sought a pre-
liminary injunction in a merger case under the All Writs Act, the
International Paper Co. case,147 the application was denied. The ex-
tent to which the Commission will make use of this authority under
the All Writs Act to seek preliminary injunctions, not only in merger
cases but other cases as well, cannot be predicted. Clearly, such
authority must be used sparingly. Notwithstanding the Dean Foods
decision, it probably would be preferable for Congress to specifically
confer preliminary injunction power upon the Commission with re-
spect to all of its enforcement endeavors.
C. The Congress
As are all of the independent regulatory agencies, the Com-
mission is an "arm of Congress" and directly responsible to it. The
degree of congressional supervision has varied over the years, ranging
from very little to the establishment of specific supervisory com-
mittees, which among other things have sought to determine the im-
pact of regulatory activities on specific segments of the economy. 148
The most immediate and recurrent control exercised by Congress re-
sults from approval of the Commission's annual budget. During the
course of the appropriations hearings, the agency's past performance
is reviewed and requests for additional funds are weighed.
1. Investigations
The "arm of Congress" label is more than justified in the in-
stance of the Federal Trade Commission. tinder the original Section
6(d) of the Act,149 the Commission conducted numerous investigations
pursuant to congressional direction, particularly during the first 20
years of its existence. The reports submitted pursuant to some of these
directives resulted in the subsequent passage of important legisla-
tion.'" The Commission's investigation of the radio industry prompted
passage of the Radio Act of 1927 151 and, ultimately, the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934. 1" An investigation of electric and gas utility
145 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 611-12 (1966).
147 FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1956).
148 See H.R. Rep. No. 2967, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
149 Section 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1964), as originally drafted, gave the Com-
mission power upon "the direction of . . . either House of Congress to investigate and
report the facts relating to any alleged violations of the antitrust Acts by any corporation."
15° See generally 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 75-101.
151 Ch. 169, §§ 1-41, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
152 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964); see 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 92-93.
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corporations sparked enactment of the Securities Act of 1934, 163
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 154 the Federal Power
Act of 1935 1 ' and the Natural Gas Act of 1938.'" And the Com-
mission's chain store investigation prompted enactment of the Robin-
son-Patman Act of 1936.' 7
During its early history, a not inconsequential amount of the
Commission's funds and energies were devoted to such investigations.
As early as the 1920s, however, businesses being investigated and
economy-minded congressmen sought to curtail some of these inves-
tigative activities. In 1933 a rider to the fiscal 1934 appropriations
bill provided that "no new investigation shall be initiated by the Com-
mission as a result of a legislative resolution, except if the same be a
concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress." 158 The new
law virtually eliminated investigations at the behest of Congress, and
since that time there have been only three, and none since 1938.' 9
This compares to 48 investigations initiated pursuant to a resolution
by either branch of Congress-43 by Senate Resolution and 5 by
House Resolution—before enactment of the rider.
There can be little doubt that this rider had a profound effect
on the Commission's mission as originally conceived, particularly with
respect to the "arm of Congress" concept. While there is scant evi-
dence that the rider adversely affected the Commission's influence on
proposed legislation, although it became perhaps somewhat less direct,
it nevertheless hindered congressional utilization of the more im-
mediate and direct fact-finding activities of the Commission.'° The
Commission's broad investigatory power and fact-finding abilities are,
of course, especially useful for such endeavors.
A related situation arose in 1963 as a result of the Commission's
decision in the previous year to initiate a comprehensive investigation
of the 1,000 largest manufacturing corporations. Immediately a con-
troversy developed and strong opposition arose from business inter-
ests—especially the United States Chamber of Commerce and the
153 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1964).
154 15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1964).
155 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (1964).
150 17 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (1964) ; see 1968 FTC Ann. Rep, 91.
157 15 U.S.C. § 13c et seq. (1964); see 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 77,
158 15 U.S.C. § 46a et seq. (1964).
153 See 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 75-76, 89,
150 Members of Congress can still, of course, request the initiation of investigations.
The Senate Select Committee on Small Business, for example, requested a study on the
effect of monopolistic practices on small business. See 1968 FTC Ann, Rep. 89. This does
not have the same impact, however, as an investigation directed by either House of
Congress.
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National Association of Manufacturers. The end result was a rider
to the 1964 appropriations bill prohibiting the investigation.'
2. Legislation
The most significant aspect of the Commission's relationship to
Congress is the Commission's impact on proposed legislation or in
originating legislation. This has been an extremely productive area
for the Commission and one of enduring value. Some of the more re-
cent laws profoundly influenced by, or the direct result of, Com-
mission activities or recommendations include the 1950 amendment
to Section 7 of the Clayton Act," the "Finality" amendment to Sec-
tion 11 of the Clayton Act,'" the Fur Products Labeling Act,'" the
Flammable Fabrics Act,'" the Textile Fiber Products Identification
Act,'" the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act," and the Consumer
Credit Protection Act (Truth-in-Lending). 168
The Commission's influence upon the enactment of these laws
or their contents arises from different sources. The most direct form
of influence is a recommendation for legislation based upon the result
of an extensive investigation. More indirect forms consist of the trenet
of Commission cases and other activities, such as rule-making and
special reports.
3. Congressional Action and Quasi-Judicial Responsibility
The Commission's relationship to Congress recently came under
judicial scrutiny. The first Commission proceeding brought under
the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act was against the Pillsbury
Company challenging its acquisition of two smaller regional com-
petitors." The case came before the Commission upon the hearing
examiner's dismissal of the complaint, and one of the issues involved
the sufficiency of evidence in a section 7 proceeding. The precise
issue was whether a substantial market foreclosure amounts to a per
se violation of section 7, 1 " or whether additional evidence is needed
showing that "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
161 The Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-215, § 1,
77 Stat. 431, provides in part `What no part of the foregoing appropriation shall be
used for an economic questionnaire or financial study of intercorporate relations."
162 15 U.S.C. § 18 et seq. (1964).
163 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) et seq. (1964).
161 15 U.S.C. § 69 et seq. (1964).
165 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq. (1964).
166 15 U.S.0 § 70 et seq. (1964).
167 15 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
168 15	 §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1671-77 (Supp. 1969).
169 Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
170
 The so-called "substantiality" test was applied by the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 171
 The Commission
rejected the per se approach and held that "it would not be sufficient
to show that an acquiring and an acquired company together control
a substantial amount of sales, or that a substantial portion of com-
merce is affected." 172
 Aside from this particular issue, which was not
at the core of the examiner's ruling, the Commission disagreed with
the dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case to the examiner.
While the matter was pending with the examiner, hearings were
being conducted by the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust of the House Judiciary Committee.'" During the course of these
hearings, members of Congress made repeated references to the then
pending Pillsbury case, which were critical of the Commission's han-
dling of the case. Particular criticism was levied against the Commis-
sion's evidentiary ruling as to the manner in which a prima facie sec-
tion 7 case was to be established.
When the case was finally concluded by a divestiture order of
the Commission"4
 and appealed to the court, one of the issues raised
on appeal was whether there had been improper congressional inter-
vention in the Commission's decision-making process. By the time the
Commission's final decision was made in 1960, only one of the four
Commissioners deciding the case, Commissioner Secrest, had also been
a Commissioner at the time of the congressional hearings in 1955. The
court noted, however, that Chairman Kintner was the Commission's
General Counsel in 1955 and thus also was "substantially exposed to
whatever 'interference' was embodied in the hearings [before Con-
gress].""5
 In vacating the Commission's order and remanding the
case, the court stated:
To subject an administrator to a searching examination
as to how and why he reached his decision in a case still
pending before him, and to criticize him for reaching the
"wrong" decision as the Senate subcommittee did in this
171 15 U.S.C. 1 18 (1964).
172 Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 564 (1953). Complaint counsel had suggested
the following test for 7 cases:
Where a leading factor in the relevant market having a substantial share of the
market, acquires another factor in that market also having a substantial share
of that market, the inference arises that competition may be substantially lessened
in the lines of commerce involved.
Id. at 564 n. 29.
173
 See generally Hearings on the Antitrust Laws Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-3
(1955); Hearings on Current Antitrust Problems Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-6 (1955).
174 Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960).
175 354 F.2d at 956.
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case, sacrifices the appearance of impartiality—the sine qua
non of American judicial justice—in favor of some short-run
notions regarding the Congressional intent . . . . It may be
argued that such officials as members of the Federal Trade
Commission are sufficiently aware of the realities of govern-
mental, not to say "political," life as to be able to withstand
such questioning as we have outlined here. However, this
court is not so "sophisticated" that it can shrug off such a
procedural due process claim merely because the officials in-
volved should be able to discount what is said and to disre-
gard the force of the intrusion into the adjudicatory pro-
cess.'"
The court did not find any actual impropriety, and its main con-
cern was the maintenance of the appearance of quasi-judicial integrity
and impartiality. Because 12 years had passed since the consummation
of the questioned acquisitions, the Commission decided to dismiss the
complaint.'
IV. THE COMMISSION'S RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE •
A. Formal and Informal Adjudications
The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure provide for
two types of proceedings—formal and informal. A formal proceeding
entails the issuance of a complaint by the Commission charging that
it has reason to believe that certain acts and practices engaged in by
respondent are violative of one of the laws it administers. Then follow
hearings before a hearing examiner, upon the conclusion of which he
issues an initial decision. The case can then be placed on the Com-
mission's docket, either on its own motion or upon appeal by either
party. The proceeding before the Commission is in the nature of an
appeal but the Commission, pursuant to the FTC Act, may decide
issues of fact in the same way as would a court of original jurisdiction,
or it can rely on the initial decision of the examiner. The concept of
the hearing examiner developed in order to expedite the proceeding,
and to relieve the Commission of the time-consuming aspects connected
with any trial. Even before the advent of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 the Commission's trial procedures had become "judicial-
ized" and it adhered to the various standards of due process.
Informal proceedings involve consent orders to cease and desist,
assurances of voluntary compliance, and general rule-making. In the
case of consent orders, the respondent agrees to the entry of an order
J 76 Id. at 964.
rrr Pillsbury Mills, Inc., No. 6000 (F.T.C., Mar. 28, 1966).
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to cease and desist without admitting that a law has been violated and
without the necessity of findings of fact by the Commission. At one
time there was considerable controversy whether the Commission could
enter orders without findings of fact which are specifically required
by the Act.'" Court challenges to the effectiveness of such orders for
failure to make findings of fact, however, have been unsuccessful.'"
Today such orders are considered to have the same force and effect
as those based upon a fully adjudicated proceeding. Once a formal
complaint has issued, the consent order procedure is no longer avail-
able to the respondent except under unusual circumstances and for
good cause shown; a settlement after the issuance of a formal com-
plaint can only be effected through the adjudicatory process by the
filing of an admission answer or upon a stipulation of facts.'" In
practice the Commission has frequently made the procedure avail-
able to a respondent at any time prior to a final order, provided
agreement on the order can be reached.
At present, the consent order procedure is made available to every
proposed respondent regardless of the gravity of the alleged vio-
lation. It is designed to facilitate the administrative process and provide
a speedy disposition of a proposed proceeding. The wisdom of making
the procedure available to every proposed respondent, and particularly
after complaint has formally issued, is questionable. It would appear
that since the fact-finding machinery of the Commission is circum-
vented, the procedure should be used with some degree of selectivity.
Its use does not, for example, appear justified in hard-core antitrust
cases in which the building of a public record may subsequently aid a
third party, private or governmental, in the preparation of a treble-
damage action. Fact-finding is among the Commission's most important
functions and should not be unnecessarily curtailed. In some instances
the Commission should not settle for anything less than a fully de-
veloped record upon which an informed judgment can be made. Unless
and until cease and desist orders based upon an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding can be used by treble-damage claimants for the purpose of
establishing a prima facie case," 1 the issue will probably remain dor-
mant.
178 Section 5(b) provides in part that the Commission
shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts
and shall issue and cause to be served on such person . . . an order requiring
such person . . . to cease and desist . . . • [Emphasis added.]
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
179 United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); FTC v.
Jantzen, Inc., 383 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1967).
iso FTC, Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(d) (1969).
181 See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958), where the Supreme
Court held that the treble damage and injunctive provisions of Clayton §§ 24 & 16, 15
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An assurance of voluntary compliance is no more than a promise
that the questioned practice has been discontinued and will not be
resumed. It carries no sanctions and cannot be enforced. The criteria
for the use of this procedure include weighing the gravity of the al-
leged violation and the prior record of the party involved. 182 It has
proven a useful procedure, especially in the deceptive practices area
in which often the practice involved would not merit the expenditure of
a full-fledged field investigation. Although the Commission has
routinely accepted such assurances after a case has been fully in-
vestigated, the procedure should in most cases, only be used before
an investigation has been made since consent orders may be better
suited for post-investigation action. Similarly, in a number of instances
the Commission has accepted repeated assurances from the same party,
involving different products or practices—a questionable procedure.
1. Collateral Suits
During recent years the Commission has placed increasing em-
phasis and reliance upon enforcement by its informal procedures. In
1963 the Commission issued a total of 431 formal complaints, of which
66 were contested and 365 settled by consent. By comparison, in 1969,
220 complaints were issued, of which 22 were contested and 198 set-
tled by consent.'" The decline of the Commission's formal case load
has been accompanied by an increase in the number of collateral suits
against the Commission in the district courts. The lowest number of
formal complaints on the Commission's docket was reached in 1968,
when 123 were issued, 23 of which were contested and 100 settled.
That same year witnessed a 75 percent increase over the previous year
in collateral suits against the Commission.'" In relation to the Com-
mission's average annual docket of 255 during the period of 1961-1969,
such suits have more than tripled.
The subject matter of collateral suits has varied widely, and, al-
though technically concerned with procedural and related matters,
many have had a profound effect on the subsequent outcome of the
Commission's proceeding. Others have resulted in great delay. In Frito-
Lay, inc. v. FTC,'" the company filed a motion in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment to
dismiss a Commission complaint. The action was filed on December 1,
U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1964), apply to only those acts specified in § 1 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1964). The Federal Trade Commission Act, because it is not listed in § 1
of the Clayton Act, would presumably not provide the basis for a treble damage or in-
junctive claim under the Clayton Act.
1 S2 FTC, Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.21(b) (1969).
18a ABA Report, supra note 60, at 20.
184 1968 FTC Ann. Rep. 25-27.
165 Civil No. 4941 (ED. Tex., April 17, 1966).
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1964. Hearings were held in May, 1965 and the district court handed
down its decision in April, 1966, denying the relief sought on the
grounds that petitioner had an adequate remedy at law, would not
suffer any irreparable injury, and that there was no genuine issue of
material fact. The ruling was appealed and in upholding the lower
court's decision the court stated:
Where Congress has provided an adequate procedure for
judicial review of administrative actions, that procedure must
be followed. Only in extraordinary cases will parties be al-
lowed to deviate from this statutory course and seek injunc-
tive relief from the district court, short circuiting the admin-
istrative procedures."
That decision was handed down on June 21, 1967, or more than three
and one-half years after the Commission had issued its complaint.'
While this case is perhaps a more unusual example of the delays caused
by collateral suits, it is typical of the problems such cases present.
In other cases, respondents in Commission proceedings have
challenged the Commission's long-standing practice of issuing factual
press releases of complaints it has issued.' 68 In reversing a lower
court's decision and upholding the Commission's right to issue such
press releases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated:
If the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected in
any measure from deceptive or unfair practices, it is essential
that he be informed in some manner as to the identity of
those most likely to prey upon him utilizing such prohibited
conduct. Certainly advice through news media as to the ac-
tions being taken by a government agency in his behalf con-
stitutes a prophylactic step addressed ultimately to the elim-
ination of the conduct prohibited by the statute.'
Most collateral suits (1) involve a ruling by the Commission
during the course of an adjudicatory proceeding adverse to respondent
from which redress is sought in the courts, or (2) allege bias and pre-
judgment on the part of the Commission. In those instances in which
injunctive relief is denied, the courts most commonly find failure to
exhaust the administrative process and absence of irreparable injury.
One court has stated:
18e Frito-Lay, Inc. v. FTC, 380 F.2d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1967).
187 Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 8606 (F.T.C., Nov. 13, 1963).
188 Cinderella Career & Finishing School, Inc. v. FTC, 1967 Trade Cas. 11 72,072
(D.D.C., April 13, 1967).
189 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
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Interference with the conduct of proceedings before an
administrative agency, through the equity powers of the
court, as distinguished from supervision and control by di-
rect review, has long been the exception rather than the
rule. . . . Accordingly, as a prerequisite to judicial inter-
vention—at least where preliminary matters are involved—
the cases have consistently required a showing of a patent
violation of constitutional or statutory authority by the
agency, as well as an absence of an alternative avenue of
relief to the injured party.' 90
Notwithstanding expressions of judicial restraint concerning inter-
ference in an administrative proceeding, the courts have shown an
increased willingness to entertain such suits as indicated by their in-
creased frequency.
2. Interlocutory Appeals
In a corollary development, the number of requests for inter-
locutory appeals to obtain Commission review of an order by a hearing
examiner have followed a pattern similar to that of collateral suits.
In ruling on such requests the Commission must be careful to avoid
the temptation to second-guess the examiner, who is charged with the
primary responsibility of conducting the trial. The general rule is that
only such requests showing that an examiner's ruling involves sub-
stantial rights which will materially affect the final decision or involves
a clear abuse of discretion by the examiner will be granted by the
Commission. The soundness of this rule is clear—the Commission can-
not conduct the trial by remote control. Experience has shown that
the greater the Commission's willingness to interfere in proceedings
before an examiner the greater the likelihood that the case will en-
counter procedural difficulties and delays. Only infrequently can Com-
mission intervention aid in the orderly and expeditious conduct of the
trial. More often than not, however, one successful appeal to the Com-
mission invites another, and before long the case is firmly embedded in
a morass of procedural matters. These procedural delays are detrimen-
tal to the Commission's effort to provide expeditious relief for con-
sumers. Such delays are a sound reason for favorable consideration
of current legisaltive proposals which would authorize the Com-
mission to seek injunctions pendente Iite of suspected violations of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."' This authority
190 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
191 See Introduction of S. 2246—Deceptive Sales Act, 115 Cong. Rec. 5579 (daily ed.
May 26, 1969) (text of S. 2246). Section 2 of the proposed bill would give the Com-
mission temporary injunction power. The same power would be conferred by a bill
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would greatly expedite Commission proceedings and consequently
would be in the interests of not only the Commission but respondents
as well.
B. Guidance Procedures
Since 1962 the Commission has utilized two additional procedures
—trade regulation rules and advisory opinions—in its enforcement
scheme. The trade regulation rule procedure is designed to deal with
a specific problem facing an industry. The procedure provides for a
public hearing and submission of comments by interested parties and
the promulgation of a rule based upon the public record so developed.
These rules are more than advisory, and a showing of nonconformity
with a rule can be used to establish a prima facie case under section 5.
Thus, the Rules of Practice provide that
[w] here a trade regulation rule is relevant to any issue in-
volved in an adjudicative proceeding thereafter instituted,
the Commission may rely upon the rule to resolve such issue,
provided that the respondent shall have been given a fair
hearing on the applicability of the rule to the particular
case. 10'2,
The purpose of the procedure is to dispose of an issue of fact or law
on the basis of an extensively developed record, and thereby preclude
the necessity of repetitious findings in subsequent proceedings. For
example, the rule-making proceeding involving batteries determined
that the present state of the art has not produced a leakproof flash-
light or similar battery. Based on this finding, the Commission held
that it would be an unfair practice to label or guarantee such batteries
as "leakproof.'" In the event a leakproof battery is developed in the
future, the rule will be modified or amended. Ideally, a trade regulation
rule avoids the necessity of proceedings against a widespread unfair
or deceptive trade practice on a case-by-case basis since it is binding
on all members of the industry.
The advisory opinion procedure was instituted to permit a busi-
nessman to seek Commission guidance concerning the legality of a
proposed course of action. The Commission will not render this ad-
vice, however, if an investigation or corollary inquiry is required to
render an informed judgment. Businessmen have made extensive use
of the procedure and elicited the Commission's opinion on a wide
introduced by Senator Magnuson. See Introduction of S. 3201—Consumer Protection Act
of 1969, 115 Cong. Rec. 15445 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1969) (text of S. 3201).
192 16 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1969).
103 16 C.F.R. § 403 (1969). The Commission's concern with battery leakage re-
sulted from numerous complaints that a battery Teak had destroyed radios or toys,
although the battery was labeled leakproof.
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variety of subjects. The procedure does, however, raise a number of
questions, notably, whether it is justified to commit scarce resources
to the analysis of a proposed trade practice, which, even if considered
deceptive, the Commission would not challenge in an enforcement pro-
ceeding. Similarly, there appears little merit in the practice of having
the Commission assume the function of legal counsel for businessmen
on an individual basis. It would seem therefore, that the Commission's
available resources could be utilized more effectively. Moreover, it is
not at all certain that, even conceding a modicum of benefit flowing
from the procedure, it is of such value to the businessman as to warrant
its expense. For example, a total of 33 advisory opinions involving
tripartite promotional assistance programs have been issued. The
opinions have been mixed—some approving, some qualifying and some
disapproving the proposed plan. The Commission has learned, how-
ever, that only one of these plans has actually been put into effect,
justifying the conclusion that the procedure is of limited usefulness.
It has also become apparent that with very few exceptions the proposed
course of action, which is the subject of the advisory opinion, is of
marginal public interest. A re-evaluation of the continued necessity of
the procedure is clearly in order.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The period since 1961 has witnessed some important developments
in trade regulation law, both in terms of court decisions and Com-
mission activities. These developments may be discussed under two
areas—antitrust and deceptive practices.
A. Antitrust Activity
1. Mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act
In 1957 the Commission issued a complaint against Procter &
Gamble, alleging that its acquisition of Clorox constituted a violation
of Section 7 of the amended Clayton Act in that the acquisition might
tend to substantially lessen competition in the household liquid bleach
industry. At the time of the acquisition in 1957, Procter & Gamble
was the leading detergent and soap manufacturer, accounting for 54.4
percent of the packaged detergent market in a heavily concentrated
industry where the top three firms account for 80 percent of the
market. In addition Procter & Gamble was the nation's largest ad-
vertiser, with a sales promotion budget of $127,000,000. The acquired
company, Clorox, was the largest manufacturer of household liquid
bleach, with a market share of 48.8 percent. Its nearest competitor,
Purex, accounted for 15.7 percent of the market.
In challenging this acquisition the Commission was not only con-
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cerned with its impact on existing competition but potential competi-
tion as well. The proceeding marked the first time that a conglomerate
merger, one involving companies in unrelated areas, as distinguished
from a merger between supplier and customer (vertical) or between
competitors (horizontal) had been adjudicated in a formal proceeding.
The Commission upheld the hearing examiner's finding of violation
and ordered divestiture.'" The case ultimately reached the Supreme
Court, which sustained the Commission's decision.195 Perhaps the most
important factor underlying the Court's decision was the extensive
use of advertising by the respondents. Both companies sell low-priced,
high-turnover consumer items, which to a large extent are presold by
heavy advertising outlays. Their products are sold through similar
distribution systems and reach the consumer by way of the grocery
shelf. With respect to Clorox, the Court noted the Commission's finding
that liquid household bleaches are chemically identical and the success
Clorox achieved in differentiating its product from those of its com-
petitors was directly attributable to its extensive sales promotion. As
to the impact of the acquisition the Court stated:
The anticompetitive effects with which this product-ex-
tension merger is fraught can easily be seen: (1) the sub-
stitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but
already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the com-
petitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers
and by dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively com-
peting; (2) the acquisition eliminates the potential competi-
tion of the acquiring firm. 196
The key element of the decision was the advertising capability
of Procter & Gamble, which, in fact, would permit it to out-advertise
any competitor in the liquid bleach industry. Mere existence of this
capability moved the Court to observe that "[t]here is every reason
to assume that the smaller firms would become more cautious in com-
peting due to their fear of retaliation by Procter."197
One of the shortcomings of the decision was its failure to estab-
lish a clear-cut rule of law other than the applicability of section 7 to
conglomerate mergers. Its utility as a viable precedent has not yet
been determined and its precise limits not defined. It is nevertheless
a significant breakthrough in section 7 enforcement, especially in view
of the Court's willingness to adjudicate this case within the economic
framework in which it was presented. Such "economic adjudication" is
194 Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465 (1963).
195 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
196 Id. at 578.
107 Id.
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becoming increasingly important with the ever-mounting complexity
of antitrust issues, which are no longer confined to traditional single
industry lines.
A similar situation presented itself with the 1957 acquisition of
SOS, a steel wool soap pad manufacturer, by General Foods, the
nation's third largest advertiser. The steel wool soap pad industry, at
the time of the acquisition in 1957, was an almost perfect duopoly, with
SOS accounting for .51 percent of sales and its nearest competitor,
Brillo, for 47.6 percent. Again, sales promotion and the ability to dis-
tinguish an otherwise indistinguishable product were of utmost im-
portance. The Commission issued a divestiture order which was
affirmed by the Third Circuit.'"
Although the two cases are quite similar, certain differences do
exist, especially in the manner in which they were decided. Aside from
the fact that the court of appeals relied heavily upon the then recent
Procter & Gamble decision as authority for upholding the divestiture
order, it gave considerable weight to post-acquisition developments.
Thus, the court seemed to have little difficulty in ruling for the Com-
mission when it considered that after the acquisition an extensive re-
juvenation of SOS's advertising approach, almost totally by television,
was initiated by General Foods, as a result of which "Brillo's position
deteriorated rapidly.'" In addition, the court did not feel that a
finding of violation would necessarily have to be predicated upon a
showing that the acquiring firm had been eliminated as a potential
entrant and competitor:
{General Foods] has also argued that one of the central as-
pects of the Clorox case, the elimination of the acquiring firm
as a potential competitor, is entirely missing in this case, and
that the record does not support the finding that the market
structure of the steel wool soap pad industry was drastically
altered through any loss of potential competition. It is true
that G.F. was not a potential competitor lurking on the fringe
of the soap pad market and exerting an effect on the actions
of the actual competitors. However, we do not read Clorox as
holding that "product extension" mergers must involve the
elimination of this type of potential competition to run afoul
of the Clayton Act."°
The court found that the threat to potential competition need only be
indirect, such as the substitution of a large and powerful firm which
198
 General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968).
11/ 0 Id. at 939.
2" Id. at 946.
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prior to an acquisition had no entry plans. The court considered the
substitution itself to have a depressing impact upon the quality of
competition.
In both of these cases the requisite possible adverse competitive
effect was readily apparent. Both involved an acquisition by the
dominant factor in one or more industries of the dominant factor in
another industry. It cannot be expected, however, that the holdings
will greatly solve the possible anticompetitive effects which undoubt-
edly attend the present conglomerate merger frenzy.
2. Statements of Merger Enforcement Policy
In addition to other dispositions of a variety of merger matters,
the Commission has issued a number of important reports dealing with
merger activities. These reports analyze the economic impact of
merger activity in a particular industry. In those instances in which
remedial action was indicated, the Commission attempted to use the
industry-wide approach in preference to case-by-case adjudication.
Attempts at industry-wide enforcement thus far have been limited to
horizonal or vertical merger activities, an area in which rules of
law have become more crystallized as distinct from conglomerate
mergers, for which legal precedents are still very much in the forma-
tive stage.
The first such attempt dealt with vertical integration in the cement
industry. During the early 1960s the cement industry experienced a
rash of acquisitions by cement manufacturers of their customers-
ready-mixed concrete companies. Once such a trend develops, it fre-
quently has a snowballing effect since manufacturers feel compelled
to join the movement to protect their markets. In a comprehensive
economic report,'" it was found that three-fifths of the cement.
production is consumed by ready-mixed cement companies, which con-
stitute the largest single market for cement producers. A period of ex-
cess capacity and declining profits in the 1950s sparked the search
for guaranteed outlets in the form of captive customers through
vertical integration. The consequences of the trend have been described
as follows:
Vertical forward acquisitions of large readymixed manufac-
turers do more than merely temporarily disrupt access to
cement markets by unintegrated suppliers. Such mergers tend
to deprive other suppliers of economical access to the affected
markets. A frequent response to disadvantaged firms is to
engage in defensive mergers of their own, thereby triggering
201 FTC, Economic Report on Mergers and Vertical Integration in the Cement
Industry (1966).
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other mergers. In this context unrestrained merger activity
may freeze some suppliers out of a major segment of the mar-
ket. The net effect is to shrink the size of the open market for
cement. Several adverse competitive effects may flow from
this. The number of effective competitors seeking to supply
particular markets may be diminished, thereby reducing the
intensity of competition. Moreover, the remaining smaller,
unintegrated cement consumers may find suppliers less willing
to engage in aggressive rivalry in serving their needs.'"
The report concluded that any merger between a large factor in a
local concrete market with a substantial supplier would have adverse
competitive effects.
To deal with this problem the Commission issued a statement
of enforcement policy with respect to vertical mergers in the cement
industry, outlining the circumstances under which an acquisition would
likely be challenged. 203 Specifically, the Commission announced its
intention to issue a complaint in every case involving a merger be-
tween a cement producer and a substantial ready-mixed concrete firm
in a market in which the acquiring firm was an actual or potential
supplier. Moreover, unless unusual circumstances indicated the con-
trary, the acquisition of any ready-mixed concrete company ranking
among the leading four non-integrated ready-mix producers in any
market, or the acquisition of any ready-mixed company regularly pur-
chasing 50,000 barrels of cement or more on an annual basis would be
viewed as a substantial acquisition. The statement also cautioned that
acquisitions on a smaller scale would not necessarily go unchallenged,
particularly where successive smaller acquisitions could equal the sub-
stance of one large acquisition. This enforcement policy statement and
the section 7 complaints issued prior thereto 204 are credited with halting
the merger movement in that industry. 2"
The Commission approached the merger threat in the food retail-
ing industry in a similar manner; it issued five complaints which
202 Id. at 14-15.
2" FTC, Commission Enforcement Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the
Cement Industry, (1967) (Trade Reg. Rep. 4510).
2" The Commission issued eleven § 7 complaints challenging vertical mergers prior
to the enforcement statement: Permanente Cement Co., No. 7939 (F.T.C., June 14, 1962);
Martin-Marietta Co., No. 8280 (F.T.C., Jan. 27, 1961); Lone Star Cement Corp., No.
8585 (F.T.C., July 15, 1963); American Cement Corp. No. C-681 (F.T.C., Jan. 20, 1964);
National Portland Cement Co., No. 8654 (F.T.C., Jan. 22, 1965); United States Steel
Corp., No. 8655 (F.T.C., Jan. 22, 1963); Texas Indus., Inc., No. 8656 (F.T.C., May 18,
1965); Mississippi River Fuel Corp., No. 8657 (F.T.C., Jan. 22, 1965); Ideal Cement Co.,
No. 8678 (F.T.C., Jan. 26, 1966); Lehigh Portland Cement Co., No. 8680 (F.T.C., April
1, 1966); and Lone Star Cement Corp., No. C-1159 (F.T.C., Jan. 16, 1967).
2" Staff of Antitrust Subcomm. of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., The Celler-Kefauver Act: Sixteen Years of Enforcement 23 (Comm. Print 1967).
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challenged not only horizontal mergers but also so-called "market
extension" mergers," and it issued a statement of enforcement policy
with respect to mergers in the food distribution industries. 207 The
thrust of the statement by the Commission indicated that it would
scrutinize any merger which would result in combined annual food
store sales of more than $500 million. This figure takes cognizance of
economies of scale and at which level they can be attained.
It therefore appears that whereas mergers by retail firms
with annual sales in excess of $500 million may contribute to
further concentration of buying power, in addition to any
adverse effect that they may have at the retail selling level,
it is unlikely that the prohibition of mergers by such com-
panies would have an adverse effect on efficiency. Moreover,
insofar as economies of scale require fairly large-scale opera-
tions, the goal of promoting economic efficiency might be
better achieved by channelling mergers away from the largest
firms to those whose efficiency would be enhanced by further
growth.208
The statement is noteworthy in two respects. It attempts to channel
merger activity into a specific direction and it seeks to quantify, for
enforcement purposes, the economies of scale concept. In addition, it
introduces greater certainty and predictability into merger enforce-
ment in this industry.
Since then the Commission has issued two enforcement policy
statements—one dealing with mergers in the grocery products man-
ufacturing industry,' and one dealing with mergers in the textile mill
products industry.' Finally, the Commission published an extensive
staff report on corporate mergers.'n This report and the statements of
merger policy have been especially valuable since the merger area
has been fraught with uncertainty. The expressions of enforcement
policy by the Commission not only fulfill one of the vital functions
266 National Tea Co., No. 7453 (F.T.C., March 26, 1959) ; Kroger Co., No. 7464
(F.T.C., April 1, 1959) ; Grand Union Co., No. 8458 (F.T.C., Jan. 12, 1962) ; Consolidated
Foods Corp., No. C-1024 (F.T.C., Dec. 21, 1965) ; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., No. C-1110
(F.T.C., Sept. 14, 1966).
207 FTC, Commission Enforcement Policy with Respect to Mergers in the Food
Distribution Industries (1967)(1 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 4520).
208 Id. at 14-15.
209 FTC, Commission Enforcement Policy with Respect to Product Extension Mer-
gers in Grocery Products Manufacturing (1968) (1 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 4530).
210 FTC, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Mergers in the Textile Mill Products
Industry, 33 Fed. Reg. 17708 (1968).
211 FTC, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers (1969), appearing in Hearings on
the Antitrust Laws Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8a (1969).
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for which it was created—to substitute "counsel and accommodation
for the harsher processes of legal restraint,"' but also significantly
aid in the maintenance of an adequate level of competition in impor-
tant sectors of the economy.
3. Price Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act
The most significant development in this area is the scarcity of
proceedings over the past ten years. Probably the most important
reason for this is the divergence of views as to the proper enforcement
of the Act which, as the record over the past years demonstrates, has
resulted in little or no enforcement at all. There are, however, two
significant recent cases. In the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lloyd
Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC,213 the Commission charged Fry, the na-
tion's largest producer of asphalt roofing products, with violations
of Section 2(a) of the amended Clayton Act' due to its pricing prac-
tices in the Knoxville, Tennessee area. Section 2(a), subject to certain
defenses, prohibits a seller from charging discriminatory prices to
different purchasers "where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce . . . . 7,215
The asphalt roofing products industry consists of about 10 major
producers, of which Fry is the largest, and a large number of local and
regional independents selling at prices below those of the major pro-
ducers. The instant proceeding arose because Fry was selling at lower
prices in the Knoxville area than in other areas of the country "with
the purpose of disciplining small independent concerns selling below
the prices established by Fry and followed by other majors.'" With
respect to the statutory requisites of competitive injury, the court
stated:
An intent to harm competitors distinguishes anticompetitive
price cutting from competitive activity not meant to be pro-
hibited per se by the Robinson-Patman Act. An illicit intent
serves to show the substantiality and probability of the com-
petitive effects that may result from price reductions. If, as
here, the price reductions are substantial and prolonged,
it is proper to invoke the statute to curb the discriminatory
pricing.'"
212
 16 Bureau of Nat'l Literature, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 8158
(Supp. 1917).
212 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
214 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
215 Id.
216 371 F.2d at 281.
217 Id. at 281-82.
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The decision crystallizes previously traditional views that two distinct
standards of illegality should be applied in price discrimination cases,
depending upon the existence of predatory intent. The absence of
predatory intent would require a fairly comprehensive analysis to
determine whether the discrimination may substantially lessen com-
petition. The standard of competitive injury is not one of injury to a
competitor but to competition as a whole. The Attorney General's
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws explained the standard as
follows:
[It] is not "injury" to competitors but adverse effects on
"competition with" parties privy to discriminations that the
statute expressly forbids . [C] riteria of competitive effect
which focus exclusively on individual competitor's sales or
profits rather than the health of the competitive process
literally go beyond the terms of the law.
In some circumstances . . . injury to even a single com-
petitor should bring the Act into play. Predatory price cutting
designed to eliminate a smaller rival, for example, is a prac-
tice which inevitably frustrates competition by excluding
competitors from the market or deliberately impairing their
competitive strength. 218
The Fry case is noteworthy because the court went a step beyond this
theory and suggested that predatory intent in and of itself may be
relied upon for a showing of adverse effects without an actual showing
of competitive injury even to one competitor.
A cautionary note, however, is in order. The establishment of an
enforcement blueprint appears relatively easy, but efforts to distin-
guish injury to competition from injury to competitors tend to become
somewhat esoteric. In actual practice it frequently is far more difficult
to make such a distinction, for it is competitors who, in the final
analysis, make tip competition. In some instances the mere threat of a
price discrimination is sufficient to cause a weakening of the com-
petitive process, which would indicate that an across-the-board applica-
tion of the competitor-competition distinction may not be particularly
meaningful.
In National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC 219 the court upheld the
Commission's finding of illegal territorial price discrimination arising
out of respondent's 2-for-1 promotion in the Washington, D.C.-
Baltimore-Norfolk-Richmond area. Respondent, in order to increase
its market share in these areas, offered retailers two cases of fruit
218 Att'y Gen. Rep. 165.
219 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969).
771
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
spread (jam and jelly) for the price of one, which amounted to a sale
below cost. It also brought respondent's price below that of its regional
competitors. There were no quantity limits imposed by the offer, and
the response was enormous. The court sustained the Commission's
conclusion of injury to competition, which was based upon a market
analysis of respondent's leading regional competitors. Three of these
competitors had lost an average of 30 percent of sales as a result of
the offer. Although it did not consider predatory intent a necessary
element for a finding of violation, the court upheld the Commission's
finding of predatory intent, on the grounds that the competitive impact
of the offer was reasonably foreseeable in light of the surrounding
circumstances. 22° While this case represents an example of a more
flagrant violation of section 2 (a) than is ordinarily found, it also
demonstrates the need for a continuous enforcement program, rather
than for revision or repeal of the price discrimination prohibition as
has been suggested by some.' One aspect of the criticism of the Act
which deserves mention is that often such proposals are devoid of
supportive empirical data. Until an exhaustive review of the law has
been made it would appear that recommendations for change are
premature.
An important development relating to Sections 2 (d) and 2(e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act is the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc.' These sections are aimed at advertising
allowances or promotional services which are not made available to
competing purchasers on proportionally equal terms. They are prin-
cipally intended to expose covert price discrimination. Hence, they are
absolute and do not depend upon a showing of competitive injury for
the establishment of a prima facie case of violation. 223
The Fred Meyer decision deals with one of the more difficult
aspects of the statute—the issue of who is a "competing customer." In
that case, Fred Meyer operated a chain of supermarkets and many
of its purchases were made directly from a supplier (manufacturer)
as distinguished from a wholesaler. From some of these suppliers
Fred Meyer received promotional allowances which were not available
to supermarkets competing with those operated by Fred Meyer be-
cause they purchased from wholesalers. The Commission challenged
this arrangement and found that Fred Meyer had unlawfully induced
220 The court noted that "the Commission was warranted in finding the petitioner
undertook an all out program, not caring what the effect would be on local competition
and, in fact, fully intended to damage its competition." Id. at 619.
221 See Presidential Task Force, (Stigler Report) Report on Productivity and Com-
petition (1969) (BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 413, at X-1, X-8 (June 10,
1969)).
222 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
223 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959).
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some of its suppliers to engage in discriminatory sales promotion ac-
tivities in violation of section 2(f). Fred Meyer advanced the argument
that its suppliers could not have violated the "proportionally equal"
requirement of the statute because the customers—the wholesalers
and Meyer, a retailer—were not in competition with each other. The
Commission, in similar situations, had previously sought to establish
some nexus, however slight, between those retailers purchasing through
a wholesaler and the manufacturer, upon which to predicate a finding
of violation. 224
The Supreme Court, in rejecting Fred Meyer's position, stated:
we cannot accept ... this argument, for it rests on the narrow
definition of "customer" which becomes wholly untenable
when viewed in' light of the central purpose of section 2(d)
and the economic realities with which its framers were con-
cerned.22"
Thus, in preference to a technical and restrictive definition of "com-
peting customer," the Court based its holding upon the end result of
the practice involved and whether the Act was intended to encompass
that result. It was clear that those retailers competing wih Fred Meyer
and to whom these promotional allowances were not made available
were at a decided disadvantage. It is equally clear that the fact that
some retailers purchase directly from a manufacturer and others pur-
chase through a wholesaler has no bearing on the issue whether they
are in competition with each other since any other interpretation would
"frustrate the purpose of section 2(d). 122°
Due to the intricacies of the two sections, the Commission had
issued guides for advertising allowances and other merchandising
services in 1967. 227 These were revised subsequent to the Fred Meyer
decision. The guides are intended as a general and practical manual
for the businessman in order to assist him in complying with the
two sections. In one instance the Commission has also issued a trade
regulation rule dealing with promotional allowances in a particular
industry in an effort to spell out the law's requirements."' The rule
marked the first time that the Commission attempted to deal with an
antitrust problem by way of a trade regulation rule proceeding.
224 Cf. Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
225 390 U.S. at 349.
226 Id. at 352.
227 FTC, Guides for Advertising Allowances and other Merchandising Payments and
Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240 (1969).
228 FTC, Discriminatory Practices in the Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry,
16 C.F.R. § 412 (1969).
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4. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
The most significant recent development under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act is the Supreme Court's decision in
FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.'-" 9
 The proceeding before the Commission
charged that Brown Shoe's "Franchise Stores' Program" constituted
an unfair method of competition prohibited by section 5. The program
involved an agreement between Brown Shoe and its retailers whereby,
in return for a variety of valuable services such as architectural plans,
merchandising records and other business aids, the retailer would con-
centrate on selling Brown shoes and not stock competing lines. Brown
is the largest shoe manufacturer in the world, and some 650 retailers
participated to varying degrees in the program. The Commission found
that those retailers participating in the program purchased about 75
percent of their requirements from Brown Shoe, the remaining 25
percent consisting of noncompeting lines. The effect of the program
was to foreclose a substantial share of the retailer dealers' market
to Brown's competitors, especially the smaller manufacturers. 23°
In finding a violation the Commission held that "Brown's opera-
tion of the franchise plan constitutes an unfair trade practice violative
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 23 ' The signifi-
cance of the holding is that it was not accompanied by a finding as
to the program's probable effects upon competition, although it did
include the fact that the Commission believed that the program's
prospective competitive impact had met the standard of illegality
under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,' the prohibition against exclu-
sive dealing. In upholding the Commission, the Supreme Court stated:
We reject the argument that proof of this section 3 element
must be made for . . . our cases hold that the Commission
has power under section 5 to arrest trade restraints in their
incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright
violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions
of the antitrust laws."
This decision is a significant expansion of section 5, because it firmly
established the Commission's broad authority to arrest trade restraints
in their incipiency before they become serious violations of other pro-
visions of the antitrust laws.
29
 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
230
 See Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963).
231 Id. at 717.
232 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). The Commission also indicated that the practice violated
§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). 62 F.T.C. at 717.
233 384 U.S. at 322.
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Another important section 5 case is the Commission's proceeding
against a number of antibiotic drug manufacturers for conspiring to
secure a patent or unfairly withholding important information from
the Patent Office. The first time the proceeding reached the courts,
although vacating and remanding the Commission's order, the court
ruled on the important procedural issue whether the Commission
has jurisdiction over acts and practices arising out of a patent ob-
tained by misrepresentation. In ruling in favor of the Commission,
the court stated:
In the present case the Commission has not undertaken to
pass upon the validity of the patents in question nor has it
held the patents to be invalid. The order recognizes the
validity of the . . . patents but compels licensing on what the
Commission found to be a reasonable royalty basis. The
Commission has not ruled that the act of obtaining the .. .
patent by misrepresentation as such constituted a violation
of Section 5, but rather that the subsequent use, for purposes
of excluding competition, of a patent so obtained, consti-
tuted such a violation.'"
After a de novo proceeding, the Commission again ordered the
respondents to make their antibiotic patents available to other com-
panies on a royalty basis. The order was based on the Commission's
conclusion that respondent Pfizer "failed to abide by the standards
of candor and good faith in procuring its patent, and that this con-
duct together with the subsequent exploitation of the . patent
constituted a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.' Upon court review the Commission's order was upheld."'
One further aspect of the case merits comment. Subsequent to
the Commission's original 1963 order, although it was vacated and
remanded, the prices of the patented goods dropped by almost two-
thirds; the Commission's licensing order should stimulate more com-
petition and further price declines. 237
234 American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 769 (6th Cir. 1966).
235 American Cyanamid Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 18,077, at 20,519 (FTC 1967).
236 Pfizer v. FTC, 410 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
237 The price decline is reported in the Commission's opinion:
Pfizer represents in its brief that bid prices to hospitals have moved down-
ward to levels of less than one-fourth of the 1958 bid prices and the list prices
in the prescription market have also fallen. According to this respondent, the
price to the retailer of one bottle of 100 capsules (250 mg.), which the record
shows was $30.60 in 1958, in now listed by Cyanamid at $11.22, and other com-
petitors of Pfizer sell at even lower "effective" prices.
3 Trade Reg. Rep. 9 18,077, at 20,521.
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B. Deceptive Practices
Action against deceptive practices has constituted an important
part of the Commission's enforcement efforts. Since 1961 the Com-
mission has manifested increased willingness to reevaluate old prin-
ciples and try novel approaches to current deceptive practice problems.
As shifts in emphasis of public policy have occurred, the Commission
has tried to adapt to the changes. The Commission has broadened its
enforcement to include areas hitherto thought to be more appropri-
ately the subject of congressional action or action by federal, state
or local governmental agencies. The trend has been to analyze spe-
cific areas by considering sociological as well as legal factors. The
Commission's concern with marketing practices affecting low-income
consumers, for example, is a recognition that the problems of low-
income consumers may be different from those of more affluent con-
mers.
The Commission also evidenced a greater willingness to abandon
the more traditional case-by-case approach in favor of an industry-
wide or specific-problem approach whenever feasible. In fact, merely
providing a forum for presentation and clarification of issues without
the achievement of any immediate solution has served a useful pur-
pose. Such a forum was provided by the Commission's consumer
protection hearings of 1969, focusing on specific problems of low-
income consumers.
One of the most persistent deceptive practices relates to the
advertising of prices, and it arises in a variety of forms such as
fictitious pricing, preticketing, bait-and-switch, and the unavailability
of advertised specials. The Commission has attempted to deal with
most of these pricing practices by way of guides or a similar enforce-
ment approach. The fictitious pricing problem was reconsidered in
the Commission's guides against deceptive pricing issued in 1964.238
The guides are concerned with former price comparisons, retail prices
and comparable value comparison, list prices and other "bargain"
advertising. The central issue in such situations revolves around the
advertiser's use of two prices—a new and lower sale price compared
to a former and high price. Unless the merchandise has previously
been sold at the former price, the new or alleged sale price is fictitious
and constitutes a deception. Similarly, the use of a manufacturer's
list price in such advertisements would constitute a deception if the
product is not customarily sold at the price in the trade area involved.
Such practices create the appearance of a bargain where none exists.
The consumer is materially misled and, in view of the importance of
price advertising, competitors may and usually do lose trade.
238 FTC, Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. § 233 (1969).
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The guides provide advice to the businessman as to the circum-
stances under which this type of advertising would be considered
deceptive. They also treat the analogous practice of preticketing a
product at an artificially high price to permit the retailer to create
the impression of a substantial markdown. The guides, however, are
lacking in specificity. For example, in order to establish a bona fide
former price for purposes of future price comparisons, the guides
merely provide that the product must have been "ojjered to the public
on a regular basis for a reasonably substantial period of times . . ." 2"
[Emphasis added.] A more realistic test would substitute "sold" for
"offered" as the determining factor for establishing a former price.
Bait-and-switch tactics also became the subject of a guide in
1967.2" The practice is defined by the guide as follows:
Bait advertising is an alluring but insincere offer to sell a
product or service which the advertiser in truth does not
intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch consumers
from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell
something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more
advantageous to the advertiser. The primary aim of bait
advertisement is to obtain leads as to persons interested in
buying merchandise of the type so advertised.'"
The unsuspecting consumer frequently does not realize he has been
the victim of the practice. Thus, for example, when a customer re-
sponds to an advertisement and is shown a product of shoddy quality
or poor condition, he often "switches" to a higher priced product
without realizing he has been duped. Inasmuch as the Commission
has previously relied upon a substantive test to establish a prima fade
case by consumer testimony, detection and subsequent proof were
difficult. In a recent case, however, the Commission applied an objec-
tive test to make out a prima fade case: if a product is advertised
on a regular basis and no sales are consummated at the advertised
price, but at the same time sales are consummated at higher prices, a
strong inference arises that the retailer is engaged in bait-and-switch
tactics."' This test, if upheld, should facilitate Commission proceed-
ings against bait-and-switch tactics considerably. Rather than having
to rely on testimony, the Commission need only compare a retailer's
advertisement of a product with the corresponding sales record to
determine whether the advertisements constitute a bona fide offer
to sell the product involved.
289 Id. § 233.1.
240 FTC, Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 238 (1969).
241 Id .
242 New York Jewelers, Inc., No. 8714 (F.T.C., Sept. 29, 1966).
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A related problem arose in connection with the Commission's in-
vestigation of food retailers. Traditionally, food retailers rely heavily
on advertising to attract shoppers and especially on the use of "spe-
cials" in such advertisements. The investigation determined that there
is a considerable difference as to the availability of advertised specials
in stores serving low-income areas and those stores serving high-in-
come areas. In the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, for example,
it was "found that 23 percent of advertised special items were not
available in low-income area stores as compared to only 11 percent
not available in higher income area stores."'" In view of the im-
portance of price advertising by food chains, inadequate stock of
advertised specials to meet a reasonably calculated demand tends to
be misleading. In addition, the consumer who responds to the adver-
tisement only to find the "specials" unavailable is either inconvenienced
or must pay higher prices. In order to deal with this problem, which
particularly affects low-income consumers, the Commission has ini-
tiated a trade regulation rule proceeding.244
If price advertising ranks among the most potent of promotional
weapons and it is therefore of utmost importance that it be free from
deception, certainly a close second is the use of guarantees in the
advertising and promotion of products. Many such guarantees turn
out to be meaningless or, at best, severely limited by the fine print. A
guarantee is a two-pronged claim in that it not only promises some
degree of adjustment if the product fails prematurely, but it also
constitutes an implied representation that the product will perform as
promised. Thus in addition to assuring performance by the seller for
failure of the product, the guarantee serves as an added inducement
to buy by insuring product performance.
The many abuses occasioned by guarantee advertising prompted
the Commission to issue guides against deceptive advertising of guar-
antees, which require that whenever a guarantee is used in the promo-
tion of a product or service its terms and conditions and the manner
of performance thereunder be clearly spelled out. 245 For example,
if a purchaser, in order to make a claim under the guarantee, is re-
quired to ship the product back to the manufacturer at his own ex-
pense, this fact must be clearly disclosed. Similarly, if the guarantee
prorates the product's usefulness over a period of time, this fact must
be disclosed, as well as any service and handling charges which may
be imposed. The guides also recognize the fact that a guarantee may be
243 FTC, Economic Report on Food Chain Selling Practices in the District of Colum-
bia and San Francisco 5 (1969) (summarized in 3 Trade Reg. Rep. IF 10,374).
244 34 Fed. Reg. 18252 (1969).
245 See 16 C.F.R. § 239 (1969).
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a misrepresentation, in which case the guarantor is considered to assume
the responsibility for the truth of the representation. An example is
the representation "guaranteed to grow hair or money back." Com-
pletely aside from the money-back representation, even if true, the
guarantee representation cannot be made if the product will not in
fact grow hair. 24°
The fantastic growth and competitive impact of games of chance
employed by food and gasoline retailers during the past decade, and
numerous consumer complaints concerning their use prompted a Com-
mission investigation of that industry. The results of this investigation
are contained in an economic report on the use of games of chance
in food and gasoline retailing."' With respect to the possible decep-
tive advertising of games, the report states:
Seldom disclosed is the actual number of prizes to be distrib-
uted in a specified area over a definite period of time. Nor do
such advertisements spell out the breakdown of the number
of prizes by various size categories. Our investigation has re-
vealed several instances of apparent deceptive assertions in-
cluding:
(1) the advertised number of prizes to be awarded was not
in conformity with the number actually programmed;
(2) the advertised odds of winning were not in conformity
with the actual odds; and
(3) the games user (that is, the grocery chain) continued
to advertise that customers could win big prizes although
winning slips were no longer available."'
On the average, the programmed cash prize per store visit was cal-
culated to 1.1 cents and the programmed chances of winning any cash
prize was 3.4 to 1000 per store visit.
The Commission subsequently attempted to regulate the use of
promotional games by promulgating a trade regulation rule.'" It is
questionable, however, whether such games can be adequately regu-
lated, and it would probably have been preferable to prohibit the use
of games of chance and similar promotional devices outright as an
unfair method of competition and deceptive practice. Pursuant to the
doctrine laid down in Keppel,' the Commission would have been well
246 16 C.F.R. § 239.7 (1969). In a related development, the problems created by
automobile warranties were examined, FTC, Report on Automobile Warranties (1968)
(summarized in 3 Trade Reg. Rep. It 10,377).
247 FTC, Economic Report on the Use of Games of Chance in Food and Gasoline.
Retailing (1968).
248 Id. at 5.
249 16 C.F.R. § 419 (1969).
250 FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). See pp. 749-50 supra.
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within its authority to do so. As it stands, games of chance will prob-
ably be superseded by other hitherto unregulated similar promotional
activities. The cost of these promotions, unless absorbed by the user
(an unlikely prospect) will ultimately be passed on to the consumer in
the form of higher prices.
Two trends in Commission activity regarding deceptive practices
have developed. First, the Commission has placed greater emphasis
and reliance upon industry-wide enforcement and general fact-finding.
In a number of instances, hearings, such as the consumer protection
hearings, were held dealing with a wide range of topics. Although such
hearings may not necessarily have culminated in definite enforcement
action, the approach serves to provide a valuable forum for the pre-
sentation of issues and may provide the direction for further inquiry,
including enforcement proceedings. An effective industry-wide approach
can achieve far more equitable enforcement, at substantial cost savings,
than ad hoc adjudication. Moreover, such hearings, when coupled with
general fact-finding activities, provide a solid basis for legislative
recommendations or trade regulation rules.
The second trend has been an extension of the concept of affirma-
tive disclosure in labeling and advertising. The increased complexity
and variety of products in the marketplace require greater knowledge
on the part of the consumer. It is no longer enough merely to prohibit
false or misleading advertising; what is needed is more informative ad-
vertising. Congressional awareness of this fact is evidenced by the pas-
sage of the various labeling acts, and the Commission is steadily
moving in the same direction by way of requiring affirmative disclosure
of material facts.'" A fact bearing on the decision to buy or not to buy
is material and, hence, even in the absence of outright deception, it
may become the subject of an affirmative disclosure requirement.
VI. PROSPECTIVE ISSUES OF THE 1970s
Never in the history of the Commission has it faced a future of
so much uncertainty in a number of respects, both as to its mission
and as an institution, as it does now. The Commission has been scru-
tinized, analyzed and criticized. This examination has not been limited
to the legal profession but has been joined by economists,'" journal-
251 See, e.g., Trade Regulation Rule Proceeding Relating to Case Labeling of Textile
Products, 34 Fed. Reg. 17776 (1969).
252 Presidential Task Force, Report on Productivity and Competition (Stigler Re-
port) (1969) (BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 413, at X-1, X-3 (June 10,
1969)).
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ists,255 students,'" and by members of the Commission itself. 255 Fun-
damental to these endeavors is the desire to improve the Commission.
However, differing degrees of analytical depth have been brought to
bear on the problem, and there has been no agreement on why and how
such improvment should be accomplished. Some significant issues have
been omitted entirely. The diversity of views is, perhaps, the most
puzzling part of the recent proposals for improving the Commission.
The current criticism does, however, suggest a number of impor-
tant issues likely to attract further attention. The first and most
important issue is whether the Commission, as an institution, has
outlived its usefulness. The issue has been raised by suggestions
to abolish not only the Commission 255 but all regulatory agencies.
To a great extent that suggestion fails to take into account the
principal reason for the establishment of the regulatory agencies—
regulation. Abolishment proponents often appear to aim at regulation
itself rather than the regulatory institution at which they purport to
aim. Since it can safely be assumed that the need for regulation will
continue, the question then becomes: Who should regulate and how?
With respect to the Commission, it could be argued that its law en-
forcement functions should be transferred to the executive branch of
the government, its legislative functions reclaimed by Congress, and
that a trade court be established to handle its judicial functions. There
is no reason to suspect that the regulation of trade could not be accom-
plished in that fashion. On the other hand ; there is no reason to suspect
that it would be an improvement over available methods presently
being used. It is a curious phenomenon in the antitrust and trade reg-
ulation field that recommendations for limiting, cutting back or abol-
ishing specific legislation or institutions are almost totally devoid of
empirical data to support such propositions. The following statement,
made 15 years ago, would seem to apply also to present efforts to re-
structure the enforcement scheme.
The amazing thing about the vociferous new criticism of the
antitrust laws is the paucity of evidence it has offered to show
that antitrust decisions have actually had or even threatened
253 L. Kohlmeier, The Regulators (1969). See O'Reilly, Book Review, p. 863 infra.
254 E. Cox, R. Fellmeth & J. Schulz, The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion—A Critique of the Consumer Protection Record of the FTC, 115 Cong. Rec. E 370
(daily ed. Jan. 22, 1969) (reprinted in the Record at the request of Senator Nelson).
zss Responses to Questionnaires on Citizen Involvement and Responsive Agency
Decision Making, Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of Sen. Comm. on
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1969).
256 Cf. ABA Report 118-19 (statement of Richard A. Posner).
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to have the awful economic consequences that they predict
so freely."57
There is a "paucity of evidence" supporting present proposals chal-
lenging the continued usefulness of the regulatory structure. Even
aside from the fact that a change will not guarantee improved per-
formance, there is considerable doubt whether the Commission's entire
enforcement program is transferable to other governmental units. The
enforcement mandate of section 5, declaring unlawful unfair methods
of competition is extremely broad in character, and lacks definitional
specificity. Enforcement actions under this provision by the executive
branch of the government would almost certainly invoke a court chal-
lenge for vagueness, which in all likelihood, under present legal prin-
ciples, would be upheld.'
The remedy for improved regulatory performance does not lie in
the abolishment of the regulatory agency as an institution. The reasons
for its continued existence are as valid today as they were at the time
of their creation. Efforts to obtain greater efficiency of operation and
more effective enforcement should be channelled into more detailed
analysis of how improvement can be obtained within the present
framework.
Another important issue involves the balance between "consum-
erism" and antitrust enforcement. Efforts by various groups to protect
consumers have included proposals that the Commission become more
active in this area. The Commission itself has ventured into some
previously unexplored areas as evidenced by the housing complaints"
and orders seeking to limit application of the holder in due course
doctrine in certain instances.'" It has been recognized that not all
consumers have the same problems,'" and that the traditional goals of
preventing deceptive advertising and labeling practices may not ade-
quately protect some consumers. To others, not even affirmative dis-
closures and informational labeling affords the desired degree of
protection. A more immediate concern, however, is that too great a
reliance on direct consumer protection may result in the neglect of
antitrust enforcement, by design or accident. The balance between
211 J. Dirlam & A. Kahn, Fair Competition and the Antitrust Laws 769 (1954). See
also E. Mason, Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem 389 (1957).
258 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
25U First Buckingham Community, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. g 18,357 (FTC May 20,
1968).
250 All-State Indus., Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. If 18,740 (FTC April 1, 1969). See also
Household Sewing Mach. Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 18,882 (FTC Aug. 6, 1969).
261 See, e.g., FTC, Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices
of District of Columbia Retailers (1968). The report examines the difficulties encountered
by low-income consumers in the purchase of merchandise.
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deceptive practices and restraints of trade which presently exists should
not be permitted to be tipped in favor of deceptive practices. If anything,
a greater amount of the available enforcement funds should go to anti-
trust enforcement than is presently the case since that is at the core of
"consumerism." The enthusiasm for consumer protection on the label-
ing and advertising front should not disguise the need for, and impor-
tance of, a continuous and vigorous antitrust program. It would be a
distinct disservice to the public interest to overemphasize some "con-
sumerism" activities at the expense of antitrust enforcement, since anti-
trust violations generally result in trade practices, particularly regard-
ing pricing, which force all consumers to pay excessive prices for
goods and services.
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